Issues concerning nuclear capabilities are on the daily agenda of news agencies covering the Middle East. However, we often tend to miss the bigger picture and the historical background. How did the problem start, and how did it get to its present-day state?
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Nuclear technology in itself is of a dual-use nature, meaning that it can be used for both civilian and military purposes, as the underlying series of nuclear technologies called the nuclear fuel cycle is practically the same. The release of nuclear energy can be achieved either by the split (fission) of the nucleus of uranium or plutonium or by the fusion of the nuclei of hydrogen. Plutonium, however, cannot be found in natural environments; it is a by-product in a reactor, while fusion needs such a great force that can be gained only from nuclear fission. Consequently, the primary material to be found in nature is uranium. Uranium has several isotopes, of which U-235 is suitable for further processes. Therefore, uranium has to be enriched, i.e., the content of U-235 has to be increased. The most widespread technology is through uranium centrifuges. Natural uranium usually includes some 0.7% U-235, while the presently available civilian technologies need a higher content. Thus, a U-235 content below 5% is considered civilian, while from 90% upwards, we speak of weapon-grade uranium. Uranium enrichment, therefore, is the most proliferation-dangerous technology, together with the treatment of the spent fuel after the proper use, e.g., in a nuclear power plant. It is here that plutonium can be extracted, which is even more dangerous from a military use aspect, as so far, there are no credible technologies to use plutonium for peaceful/civilian purposes.
Ultimately, however, it will depend on the decision-maker (the state) to what use it will turn these technologies into nuclear energy for civilian purposes (e.g., nuclear power plants, but many more technologies in industry, agriculture, medicine, etc.) or nuclear weapons. It has to be noted, however, that even civilian nuclear capability is relatively limited globally: there are approximately only ca. forty states that are in possession of some parts of the fuel cycle (e.g., a uranium mine or a nuclear power plant), and only about a dozen states that have the full series of technologies as well as the relevant infrastructure. In the Middle East and North Africa, there are only two states, Israel and Iran, which have mastered and developed the full nuclear fuel cycle. Although this in itself does not necessarily mean the presence of a military nuclear program, it carries the potential and the technical capability to step over the nuclear threshold.
Military and/or Civilian nuclear programs in the Middle East and North Africa
In probably the most volatile region of the world, the remarks above have two serious consequences: 1. while the civilian nuclear capability cannot legally be rejected to any state actor, extra care and attention should be given that no country steps over the nuclear threshold; 2. since at the moment there is just one state (Israel) in the possession of nuclear weapons in the region, every measure must be taken to avoid the spread (or proliferation) of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the frequent military presence of the internationally acknowledged nuclear weapon states region – the US, the Soviet Union/Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France – further complicates the regional nuclear environment.
Regarding regional efforts aiming at acquiring nuclear weapons, to this day, it is Israel that – based on indirect proofs – is internationally accepted as a state in possession of nuclear weapons. The Israeli nuclear ambiguityrests on the doctrine of “not to acknowledge, not to deny” the capability, complemented by the saying of former Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol that “Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region,” to be further complemented by former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin saying, when Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor of Osiraq in 1981, that “but it will not let others do that either.” In their efforts to counterbalance the Israeli military superiority, several Arab states tried to acquire nuclear weapons (or were charged with the intention or efforts), most notably Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Still, these efforts always remained in the most preliminary phases. The case of Iraq, however, was very much different as the 1990s were spent trying to prevent Iraq under Saddam Hussein from developing such weapons. Finally, the 2003 Iraq war solved the problem and terminated all segments of the Iraqi nuclear program, military or civilian.
In the 2000s, Iran’s nuclear program and capability ruled the international agenda. In spite of the fact that Iran continuously states that its program is of a civilian nature only, ruled by the fatwa by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (“it is forbidden in the Islamic Republic to develop, store or use nuclear weapons”) as such, Iran has been widely suspected, and even sanctioned, of running a secret military program. Yet, so far, no such clear evidence has been provided by any of the antagonists.
The international controversy over the Iranian nuclear program after several years and increasingly stringent UN Security Council sanctions (2006-2010) has come to a – temporary – halt by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded by the five permanent members of the UNSC (P-5) plus Germany on the one hand, and Iran on the other. With the implementation started in January 2016, it seemed that the international community could credibly justify the civilian nature of the Iranian program, while the right of Iran to a civilian nuclear program (as granted by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) was maintained. Even though Iran abided by its commitments under the JCPOA, US President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA in May 2018. Although Iran abided by its commitments (strategic patience) for another year, due to the US sanctions, no international actor could continue cooperation with Iran. Since May 2019, Iran has gradually “stepped away” from the commitments in the JCPOA while never officially terminating the agreement.
Nevertheless, in a region where nuclear energy is still limited, even the civilian nuclear capability reflects technical modernity and may thus add to the regional power status of both. Out of the twenty-five states of the Middle East and North Africa, few have had some elements of a nuclear program, and it is only Iran – and most recently the United Arab Emirates – which use nuclear energy for generating electricity. Interestingly, despite waves of debates in Israel about the eventual construction of a nuclear power plant, Israel to this day has no such infrastructure, possibly due to security reasons.
It should be noted, however, that some six or seven Arab states signaled their intention to start a (civilian) nuclear program in 2007 following an emotional call by then Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Musa, partly in compensation for the Arab inability to force Israel give up its assumed nuclear arsenal. Among them, the United Arab Emirates, which has since then four nuclear power plant units (Baraka 1-4) in operation, and Saudi Arabia, which, at least since 2023, has been in negotiations with the US in a potential Saudi-Israel-US Abraham Agreement (or a Saudi-US bilateral agreement) about a small civilian nuclear program. Iran has been working together with Russia on a second Bushehr nuclear power plant, while in Türkiye, the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is underway.
This limited nuclear capability within the region, therefore, makes it clear that in any eventual nuclear development, the region as a whole, with the only exception of Israel and Iran, and to a certain extent the UAE and maybe Egypt, relies entirely on expertise and know-how from external sources. While in a shrinking global market, the Middle East and North Africa stand out as potential buyers of the technology, giving it some leverage, the political consequences are even more complicated. Whenever the US (or the West) presents demands, potential buyers have elsewhere to turn: countries such as Russia and China, which do not lay down conditions.
The Middle Eastern Nuclear-Weapon-Free or WMD-Free Zone – a Never-Ever Must?[1]
The Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) was first proposed at the UN General Assembly in 1974 by Egypt, supported by Iran. As an established nuclear non-proliferation “tool” by that time – the first NWFZ was established by the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1967, with other proposals, e.g., a NWFZ for Central Europe – it came to belong to the theme of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT’s) review conferences, providing a separate resolution on the Middle East in 1995 at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Yet, the fact that Israel has not been and is not a party to the treaty practically prevented the realization of any relevant proposals regarding the NWFZ. Although the 2010 Review Conference seemed to achieve a breakthrough when deciding on a conference to be held in 2012 and even assigned Ambassador Jaakko Lajaava as the conference facilitator, finally, the issue of the ME NWFZ was referred to the UN Secretary-General. Since then, two conferences have been held (2019, 2021) on the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction – with the aim of forming a legally binding treaty to establish the zone. By bringing the idea of the Middle Eastern zone under the UN Secretary-General not only made it possible to “include” Israel, but also to absorb the concept presented by Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak to expand the zone to include/ban all weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological and nuclear).
Since there has been more than one definition of the eventual zone, it should be noted that the Arab states, Israel, and Iran would, by all definitions, be included. Yet, since Israel has so far stayed out of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is no wonder that the Arab states – all parties to the NPT – have formulated a joint position on the nuclear-weapon-free zone. All the more so, as deeply rooted in the Arab-Israeli conflict, this one of the joint Arab positions represented consequentially in the international fora was the demand for the elimination of the Israeli (military) nuclear capability. (The Iranian nuclear program and the sanctions regime related to it came on the international agenda only in 2002, and while in some Arab countries’ perception it is a direct threat, others seem relatively disinterested.)
In the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Egypt has had a leading role. On the one hand, Egypt was the initiator of the idea of the ME NWFZ in 1974, and it was Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak who proposed the expansion of the zone to include/ban all weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, Egyptian diplomats – both on the international level and in regional circles – have played a leading and supporting role not only in the representation of the joint Arab position but also in the education of new generations of Arab “non-proliferator” diplomats, and in the establishment and operation of regional centers working on the different aspects of the ME NWFZ/WMDFZ.
While the expansion of the zone to include all weapons of mass destruction adds a kind of “vertical” dimension to the zone, we claim that it also adds in “horizontality”, as besides the “usual” actors in arms control and non-proliferation, namely the states and some international organizations, WMDs – more specifically chemical and biological weapons – may bring in non-state actors, armed and/or terrorist groups and organizations. (Despite the commonly held view that nuclear weapons are easy to get access to – “you can read it on the internet” – such weapons and their mid- to wide-range carriers, missiles, are practically impossible to reach for non-state actors.)
The – relatively – good news is that adherence to the main WMD treaties (the NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Treaty) is almost universal across the region. However, the very few who are staying out pose a severe threat to the universality principle of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, which should be remedied. To this end, the establishment of the ME zone is still of vital importance, with significance reaching well over the region itself. In the same vein, while it can be maintained that there is still joint-Arab support behind the ME NWFZ/WMDFZ proposal, it should also be noted that the Arab states lying on the African continent are already covered by the Pelindaba Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone over the whole of the continent. And the specific and even more imminent threats – migration from sub-Saharan Africa as well as terrorism – draw away the Maghreb’s attention from nuclear threats arising in the Mashreq (Israel, and even more so Iran) and make them turn towards the south. Thus, while it can be expected that they would support an Arab position in the zone, “universality,” i.e., all-Arab support, would be crucial.
Should the issue of the ME WMD-free zone come on the international/regional agenda seriously, it would be a valid question to ask how the Abraham Accord signatory Arab states (the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan) would behave if Israel vehemently opposed the zone. Yet, it has to be stated that neither Egypt nor Jordan have stayed away from joint-Arab initiatives despite their peace treaties with Israel, so probably – at least at the beginning – this should not be a real obstacle.
Finally, as with all so-far existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, the question would be if such a treaty may enter into force if all the regional states join or, as was mostly the case, if a certain group starts, and then it will snowball into universality. In the past few decades, there have been several scenarios, usually starting from the Persian Gulf to begin negotiations on a regional security architecture, including Iran. The pre-October 7, 2023, general de-escalation and normalization within the region could have reached the point, but it never did.
[1] This sub-chapter has been partly published under the title Certain Aspects of the Oldest Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (the Newest WMD-Free Zone?) in the Making: the Middle East. Center for Egypt and ME Studies Journal, Fourth Edition, June 2022, pp. 10-13.
