August was not an uneventful month in the Middle East, with a series of escalations at the regional level. While the temporary ceasefire talks in Gaza have failed, the situation between Israel and Iran and between Israel and Hezbollah has become more tense than ever.
The Israeli intelligence service assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on 31 July while he was a guest at the inauguration ceremony of the newly elected Iranian President. The day before, the same organization killed Fouad Shukr, a high-ranking leader of Hezbollah in Beirut, who was believed to be responsible for the Majdal Shams rocket attack in the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights. Both Hezbollah and Iran have promised a retaliatory strike, while no actor wants to get involved in an all-out war with Israel, which is not in the interest of the Jewish state either. This author contends that in the midst of an increasing threat of escalation, cautious strategic considerations by both state and non-state entities are adopted to prevent a broader conflict. Yet, it is important to note that certain non-state players, such as the Yemeni Houthi movement (its military wing, the Ansar Allah) or Hamas in the Gaza Strip, have a vested interest in a more significant escalation process.
The Haniyeh Assassination and the Iranian Strategic Calculations
Ismail Haniyeh, the Chairman of the Political Bureau of Hamas residing in Doha, traveled to Tehran in response to an invitation from the Iranian government. His purpose was to attend the inauguration ceremony of the newly elected President, Masoud Pezeshkian. An explosion occurred in his apartment, resulting in the death of Haniyeh and his bodyguard, leaving the rest of the building unharmed. The Israeli intelligence service demonstrated its professional preparedness and strategic planning in carrying out the assassination, thus restoring its reputation that had been tarnished following the Hamas attack on October 7th. Furthermore, it highlights the deficiencies of the Iranian security system, particularly since the site is owned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is in close proximity to Ali Khamenei’s apartment. Evidence indicates that individuals from Iran provided assistance to the Israeli intelligence agency. The Israeli intelligence agency has neither officially acknowledged nor denied its involvement in the assassination.
Israeli targeted killings in Iran have occurred before. In the past, a total of seven Iranian nuclear scientists were explicitly targeted, resulting in the obscure deaths of six of them in covert assassinations. The most recent occurrence took place in 2020. Israel has consistently denied any involvement of the Mossad in efforts to impede the progress of the Iranian nuclear program through various methods. However, this assassination stands out from earlier ones due to the fact that it involved the killing of a foreign individual on Iranian soil during a political event in a highly volatile Middle Eastern context.
What are the underlying Israeli motives for the targeted killing, and what was Iran’s response?
It is vital to emphasize that the newly elected President Pezeshkian is advocating negotiations with the West to lift economic sanctions. Despite significant political divisions in Iran, Pezeshkian has secured a majority in the second round of the elections, and his cabinet has recently been approved by the Parliament, indicating that Iranian society is receptive to altering its course with the United States and engaging in discussions for a new nuclear agreement. It is important to note that the President holds only partial authority over foreign policy, and the ultimate responsibility lies with the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
Israel’s objective may be to prevent any possibility of negotiations with the United States by thwarting potential talks in the event of a direct military response from Iran. If Iran were to take direct military action, it might potentially improve the international image of Israel as many Western countries might reduce their criticism of Israel’s actions in the Gaza conflict. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh is intricately connected to the events unfolding in Gaza. Haniyeh, the leader of the moderate faction of Hamas, is a prominent politician living in Doha who is actively involved in the indirect negotiations for a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. The current Netanyahu administration is now not interested in pursuing an interim cease-fire, since its objective is to persist in combatting Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
Iran has announced a three-day mourning, and Ali Khamenei called for a “harsh punishment”: “The criminal and terrorist Zionist regime martyred our dear guest in our house and made us bereaved” – said the Supreme Leader. However, it appears that the Iranian counterattack is taking longer than Israel anticipated due to strategic calculations. Firstly, it is possible that an attack comparable to the one that occurred on April 13, involving direct drone and missile strikes on Israel, may not succeed due to the Israeli defense system’s ability to effectively intercept and neutralize these threats and may again result in an international defense effort on Israel’s side. Furthermore, Iran seeks to evade direct confrontation with Washington due to the possibility of a US retaliation. Moreover, any postponement in the response could serve as a means of discouraging any potential Israeli intervention. Any overt assault, on the other hand, has the potential to undermine the ability of the newly established Iranian government to engage in diplomatic talks with Western nations. Israel views any retaliatory action by Iran as an opportunity to undermine the “Axis of Resistance” in the MENA region, which Israel considers its primary adversary.
Iran has the opportunity to retaliate for the assassination in Tehran by increasing pressure on Israel and the United States by using proxy forces. In August 2024, Iraq has witnessed a surge in attacks against US interests causing 15 U.S. soldiers and many contractors wounded. Mainly Iranian proxies like the Kataib Hezbollah were responsible for the renewed attacks against U.S. airbases and other military infrastructures. Iran has been providing semi-state actors like Hezbollah and Ansar Allah with weapons, money, and ideology. However, these groups are relatively independent in their political decisions, which are based much more on the local and national context. The IRGC spokesperson recently reiterated that: “Time is on our side, and the waiting period for this response may be prolonged.” Iran has made efforts to prevent becoming entangled in a conflict with Israel, which would harm its already negative global image.
The Majdal Shams Attack and its Aftermath: Israel vs. Hezbollah
On July 27, Hezbollah launched a missile attack on an Israeli Druze town called Majdal Shams in the occupied Golan Heights. This attack resulted in the death of 12 children. This is seen as a notable change in Hezbollah’s strategy, as they are now targeting not just military but also civilian objects. Nevertheless, Hezbollah denied its direct involvement in the attack, claiming that the group targets intelligence service bases or military infrastructure. In retaliation, Israel executed Fouad Shukr in Beirut on 30 July. Shukr was included in the United States’ list of individuals responsible for the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, which resulted in the deaths of 241 US military personnel.
In retaliation for the death of Fouad Shukr, Hezbollah launched a major attack on Israeli military and intelligence targets on 25 August 2024. After Israel had intelligence information about the planned attack, the IDF carried out a pre-emptive strike at dawn on Sunday against what they said were rocket-launching positions.
The Israel-Hezbollah conflict has been interpreted differently in both countries. In a televised address on Sunday, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah explicitly stated that the strike primarily focused on the Gilat facility, causing substantial damage to Israel, and emphasized that civilian sites were not intentionally targeted by Hezbollah. 2. The Hezbollah attack occurred on the day of the Arba’in, the mourning day that commemorates the martyrdom of Hussain ibn Ali, forty days after the Ashura. 3. Hezbollah’s objective is not to intensify the war, but they will retaliate if another attack is initiated.
On the contrary, in Israel, the Netanyahu administration stated that they successfully neutralized the 300 missiles and drones originating from Lebanon, ensuring that none of them reached the State of Israel. Netanyahu issued a warning to Hezbollah and Iran, stating that there would be significant repercussions if an attack were to occur. Israel has a significant problem on its northern front, where Hezbollah has launched rocket attacks, resulting in the displacement of around 60,000 to 80,000 Israelis and the destruction of numerous buildings. Recently, residents in the northern region of Israel have expressed dissatisfaction with the Netanyahu administration’s perceived lack of sufficient protection, asserting that they are being adversely affected by the ongoing conflict. Nevertheless, Israel and Hezbollah are not inclined to engage in a full-scale direct conflict, as the Lebanese organization possesses substantially more military capabilities than Hamas, with an estimated arsenal of 150-200,000 rockets.
However, Hezbollah is not interested in a full confrontation either, as the internal political and economic situation in Lebanon has changed since the first Israeli-Hezbollah confrontation in 2006. An attack would deepen Lebanon’s economic crisis and radically reduce Hezbollah’s popularity. Hezbollah’s main interest is to exert pressure and maintain a low-intensity conflict, which Israel has tried to avoid. An optimal resolution for Israel would involve the establishment of a security zone along the Israel-Lebanon border. This measure would effectively restrict the capacity of Hezbollah to carry out missile assaults and infiltrations, and thus ensure the safety of Northern Israel. Nevertheless, Hezbollah views it as a violation of the nation’s sovereignty, and Southern Lebanon has already experienced a comparable number of internally displaced individuals as Israel. Hence, the probability of a large-scale conflict erupting between Israel and Hezbollah in the foreseeable future is low. However, any strategic miscalculation from either party might potentially jeopardize the already precarious situation.
Towards a Regional War?
The regional patterns are interdependent with the developments of the Gaza conflict. Yahya Sinwar, the person responsible for orchestrating the October 7th terrorist incident in Israel, has assumed the top leadership post in Hamas, replacing Haniyeh. Sinwar is currently at the top of Israel’s list of wanted individuals, making any form of cooperation with him from Israel’s perspective entirely out of the question. Sinwar’s preference lies in a comprehensive cease-fire rather than a temporary one. He seeks the complete reinstatement of Hamas’s authority in the Gaza Strip, which aligns with his interests. The tripartite mediation conducted by the United States, Egypt, and Qatar last week was unsuccessful in achieving a ceasefire. At first, US Secretary Blinken stated that Israel was in favor of the American initiative. However, later on, the Netanyahu government restated its position to maintain Israeli military presence in the Philadelphi corridor and the Netzarim corridor. These preconditions, however, are not acceptable to Hamas, which means that neither party has any inclination to accept the ceasefire proposals on the table. At the very least, both parties should be able to present any ceasefire as their personal triumph. The Israelis would not perceive the reinstatement of Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip as a triumph, particularly in light of the attack on October 7th.
Following the death of Haniyeh in Tehran, Iranian diplomacy emphasized multiple times that a truce in the Gaza Strip would be interpreted as a retaliatory response to the killing of the Hamas leader. In his televised speech, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah stated that the reason for the delay in the movement’s response to the execution of Fouad Shukr was to observe and assess the outcome of the ceasefire negotiations in Gaza. Hezbollah has reiterated on multiple occasions that they would cease their missile assaults against Israel if a durable ceasefire were established.
Israel has not yet achieved the objectives of the Gaza military incursion, as determined by the unity war government. Despite suffering significant losses, Hamas still maintains the capability to deploy approximately 12-15 battalions against Israel, indicating that the threat it poses has not been completely eradicated. Israel has so far been unsuccessful in eliminating Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind behind the 7th October incident. The hostages, whether living or deceased, hold significant importance for Israeli society. From the Israeli standpoint, a ceasefire with Hamas would not eradicate the imminent danger posed by Iran or Lebanon.
Furthermore, it is crucial to acknowledge the broader regional consequences of the recent events in the MENA region. Saudi Arabia convened an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation following the death of Haniyeh. The adopted declaration calls Israel: “the illegal occupying power, fully responsible for this heinous attack.” Prior to the meeting, the Jordanian foreign minister paid a visit to Tehran in order to avert any additional escalation in the region, which might potentially entangle Jordan in a broader conflict. Although there is widespread condemnation of Israel, it appears that neither country is interested in escalating tensions in the region through a direct conflict between Israel and Iran. Nevertheless, it is imperative for them to acknowledge Iran’s anxiety at Israel’s infringement of the Islamic Republic’s sovereignty by the assassination of Haniyeh. The Middle East continues to be a place where regional powers vie for dominance without achieving immediate success.
Image credit: Talmoryair, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons. Available at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ea/Israel-iran_flages.png
