Despite the ongoing reconciliation processes in the region, little has been done to create a joint vision of a future steady order. With the emergence of opposing views and regional partnerships, the prospect of stability is receding.
Recent attacks of Israel against Hezbollah in Lebanon have once again highlighted the persistent challenge of achieving lasting peace in the region. A few years back, one can see that tensions have always existed and heightened during the Arab Spring in the second decade of the XXI century. It was noted, however, that overlapping factors such as the change in American foreign policy toward the region and the loss of a sense of security by the Gulf states were the determinants of a new path for these countries in dealing with their hitherto opponents. Consequently, a new strategy – reconciliation – was chosen to warm relations between the Gulf and Iran, Israel, Türkiye, or Syria. Today, it is uncertain whether the reconciliation process will lead to permanent peace in the Middle East. Forecasting the future of the region’s stability and peace in times of prolonged war in Gaza and rising tensions between Israel and Iran is nowadays the most difficult task to be ever accomplished.
The Gulf states, among which the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are the most active players, have opened a new chapter in the history of their relations. However, Bahrain, the smallest state in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), has called for a dialogue with Iran to restore ties that were cut off in 2016, following the lead of Saudi Arabia. In the event of ongoing processes and conflicts, it is worth exploring why these states have decided to make such a move and provide an answer to what extent the reconciliation processes contribute to prospects of tranquility.
Regional Order in the Post-Arab Spring Era
The events of the Arab Spring have contributed significantly to the growing instability in the region and disagreements among the regional state and non-state actors. They highlighted the growing competition among the Middle Eastern states. The ideological factor, i.e., the negative perception of the activity of Islamic organizations in the region (i.e., Muslim Brotherhood), was also a point of political contention between the Gulf states. Consequently, the level of hostility has increased, leading to even more turmoil in the regional order. This did not last long, however, given the losses and the unprofitability of prolonging disputes that could have triggered a wider-scale conflict.
Türkiye
The example of Türkiye sparks a new discussion about how Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar differ in their approach toward the state. Their relationship, apart from Doha, went from rivalry to broadened cooperation. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh initiated a dialogue with Ankara following a tumultuous period of the Arab Spring. Türkiye’s unstable economic situation since 2016 was one of the factors determining Ankara’s choice of a new strategy at a time of tense relations with the Gulf countries, including the UAE. In 2021, Turkish and Emirati authorities held talks to strengthen relations and concluded agreements in trade and energy investments in Türkiye. Two years later, they signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), paving the way towards an expanded cooperation.
Since 2022, Turkish-Saudi relations have also improved, starting a “new period of cooperation in bilateral relations.” A year later, during an official three-day visit of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the Gulf states – Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, their respective leaders decided to deepen their economic and military cooperation. During the meeting with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, a contract was signed for the sale of Turkish drones to the Kingdom. All agreements concluded with the Gulf states, including trade, investments, and defense, are strategically important for Türkiye due to the economic problems the country has been facing for years.
Unlike previous states, the Turkish-Qatari relations have remained stable. The differences in perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood among the Gulf states and Qatar’s support for it have been among the main reasons for the disputes that have piled up over the past few years. In 2014, Turkey and Qatar established the Supreme Strategic Committee, which became a platform for high-level talks and cooperation in several areas, mainly in the economic and security fields. In the same year, Türkiye and Qatar signed an agreement allowing the establishment of a Turkish military base in Qatar. Authorities in Ankara have provided support to Doha on several occasions – an example of this was the diplomatic blockade of Qatar in 2017. In the aftermath of a deadly earthquake that struck Türkiye in 2023, Qatar also provided immediate help.
Iran
Indeed, most attention was focused on Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023 due to their normalization agreement brokered by China. After a period of prolonged tensions and the risk of escalation, their leaders decided to restore diplomatic ties that had been severed in 2016. Yasmine Farouk mentions a few factors that are behind these decisions. Iran remained under an international sanction regime, which led to regional isolation, resulting in a poor economic situation, as well as raising pressure from the Iranian citizens on the Iranian government. The Saudi authorities are pursuing their long-term vision (Vision 2030). Hence, their successful implementation requires a stable environment. Similarly, the uncertain future of the US in the region, notably in the security sphere, was an additional factor that determined the Gulf states’ choices.
Concerning the UAE’s path toward reconciliation with Iran, their respective authorities began official talks in 2019, considering endangered security in the Gulf. According to Kristian C. Ulrichsen, the UAE sought de-escalation of rapidly growing tensions caused by missile and drone attacks on Emirati and Saudi soil. Another reason to mend ties refers to the lack of coherence of the US foreign policy toward the region and the prevention of the UAE’s strategic position in the region. There was also no desire to sever economic ties, which are a priority in this relationship – the UAE is the most important Arab trading partner for Iran. In May 2024, an important event occurred after a ten-year break: a United Arab Emirates-Iran joint economic commission. As Reuters reports, the meeting aimed to strengthen Iranian-Emirati economic relations. It is also important to note that Iran and the UAE have been in a dispute over three islands that the UAE claims to be occupied by Teheran. Despite offering a peaceful solution by the sheikhdom, no agreement has been reached so far.
Bahrain and Iran made a step forward a reconciliation, too. In April 2024, both parties agreed to set a path toward dialogue and finding a way to restore political relations. Al Jazeera reported that during the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and his Iranian counterpart, they agreed to […] “establish the necessary mechanisms to begin talks between the two countries to study how to resume political relations between them.” Bahrain followed Saudi Arabia’s footsteps in cutting ties with Iran in 2016 after a period of heightened tensions.
Qatar has adopted a strategic hedging approach towards Iran which helps its authorities maintain a stable relationship. Both states share the most extensive gas field in the world, North Field/South Pars. Despite the rift between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2016, Qatar did not sever relations with the former state. A year later, due to Qatar’s diplomatic crisis with the Gulf states, Iran and Turkey provided support, further amplifying a temporary division within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Israel
A normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab states – UAE and Bahrain, took place in September 2020. From the UAE perspective, the Accords were the first significant step towards an era of security and stability. In 2021, they signed CEPA, which entered into force a year later, paving the way toward deepened economic cooperation and a wide range of opportunities. Since 2020, multiple agreements have been signed in various sectors, i.e., health, education, tourism, technology, or trade. Israel and the Gulf states also share an important ally, the United States, with whom they aim to enhance their security framework. However, the escalation of war in the Gaza Strip has raised questions about the future of Israeli-Arab relations. Bahrain recalled its ambassador to Israel but did not completely sever bilateral ties. The UAE decided not to cut ties with Israel, either.
On the contrary, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have not yet decided to follow the UAE and Bahrain. The Kingdom officially refuses to normalize relations with Jerusalem unless the two-state solution is implemented. Qatar is a mediator in the Gaza war, attempting to bring all parties to the table and find a proper solution. However, Saudi Arabia is reported to have been holding unofficial meetings with Israeli authorities for the past couple of years. Qatar, on its part, represents another case. Despite the lack of normalization of ties with Israel, they have both coordinated help and dialogue regarding Gaza and contact with Hamas.
Will Reconciliation Lead to the Anticipated Peace?
All things considered, with so many actors pursuing various strategies against each other, it is unlikely – at least for now – to create a mechanism by which the existing problems could be solved. The Middle East lacks a strong authority that would take responsibility for security and order. As Mehran Kamrava notes, there are four regional powers, i.e., Israel, Türkiye, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, shaping a regional hierarchy with the rest of the states, such as the UAE, Qatar, Yemen, and Syria. However, it does not imply peace; instead, it implies uncertainty.
Even if the ongoing peace processes give us a flicker of hope, the ongoing conflicts and issues are an obstacle to achieving the anticipated goal. As the examples above show, each state pursues its strategy in line with its perception of reality and concerns over security. The diplomatic blockade of Qatar demonstrates that members of the GCC have a different view of its relationship with regional powers, eventually making it impossible to form a united block against current problems and challenges.
The existing conflict between Iran and Israel is no longer referred to as a “shadow war” and has reached a new level, close to an open war. Shifting the focus from one country to another regarding the reconciliation processes can be subject to increased tensions, as was done with the signing of the Abrahamic Accords and the immediate response from Iran. It must be noted that future peace heavily relies on the end of the war in Gaza. The conflict between Lebanon and Israel is adding fuel to the fire, while the perpetually protracted war in the western part of the region exacerbates the situation. The Gulf states are employing various engagement strategies in the ongoing conflict, ranging from mediation to peaceful calls to end the war, which also indicates a differentiated approach. The region is polarized, and despite the ongoing reconciliation processes, neither the right solution nor vision has been found yet.
