Given the rich diversity of Iran’s population, the new administration’s approach to its various ethnic and religious groups is a crucial question that demands attention.
In July 2024, Iranians went to the polls to elect a new president. The election was held unexpectedly following the death of Ebrahim Raisi. Understanding the broader context of this election is crucial. In addition to the regional challenges stemming from the Gaza war that began in October 2023 and ongoing international difficulties due to sanctions and tensions with the West, Iran faced significant domestic challenges. These were particularly shaped by the rise of the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, which gained momentum across the country.
This movement, which had a pronounced impact on Iran’s borderlands, brought ethnic and confessional issues to the forefront. On the one hand, it heightened awareness of the discrimination faced by ethnic groups such as the Kurds and Baluch, spotlighting the systemic inequalities endured by their communities. On the other hand, the Iranian Sunni population became increasingly critical of the state, a sentiment fueled by the securitized pressures imposed by security forces, especially in the Sistan-Baluchistan province.
New Start under Critical Circumstances
During his presidential campaign, Masoud Pezeshkian, an Azeri politician with strong ties to Kurdish and Azeri communities, emphasized addressing issues of inequality and discrimination. His message resonated with educated networks of elites from various ethnic groups, including Kurds, Azeris, Baluchs, Turkmen, and Arabs, who began mobilizing support for his campaign in their respective regions. Among Sunni elites, a coalition of prominent figures, including former Sunni parliament members, rallied around Pezeshkian, endorsing him and actively mobilizing votes.
While Sunni participation in elections is not a new phenomenon—it dates back to 1993—their support in this election was particularly crucial. The backdrop to this engagement lies in the aftermath of nationwide demonstrations that began in September 2022, particularly the tragic events of “Bloody Friday” in Zahedan in October 2022, when security forces violently suppressed protests. These incidents, combined with the growing influence of Sunni institutions like Zahedan’s Makki Mosque and its educational center, turned many Iranian Sunnis into vocal critics of the state.
Since then, relations between the authorities and the Sunni population—approximately 20% of Iran’s population—deteriorated significantly, becoming a major security concern. The state responded with a dual approach: increased security measures on Sunni communities coupled with attempts at dialogue and negotiation. For instance, the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei dispatched representatives to negotiate with Sunni leaders, including Molana Abdolhamid, but these efforts failed to yield substantial results.
Against this backdrop, Pezeshkian repeatedly expressed his commitment to following the directives of Khamenei while also signaling a clear agenda to address the grievances of Iranian Sunnis and rebuild relations with their communities. His ability to navigate these tensions and foster dialogue represents a critical aspect of his presidency, with the potential to significantly impact Iran’s internal stability and social cohesion.
The Visible Changes
One of the key expectations of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency was the appointment of a minister from the Sunni community, something unprecedented in Iranian governments. However, as anticipated, this did not materialize. The process of appointing ministers requires parliamentary approval, and given that the current parliament is dominated by hardline factions, it was unlikely they would endorse a Sunni minister. Nevertheless, Pezeshkian made a historic move by appointing a Sunni Kurd from Kurdistan, Abdolkarim Hosseinzade, as Vice President for Rural Development and Underprivileged Regions. Hosseinzade, a reformist former parliament member who had supported Pezeshkian during the campaign, belongs to a prominent Kurdish family in the region.
This appointment, along with the selection of two new governors in Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchistan, marked significant steps in Pezeshkian’s ethno-confessional policies. For the first time in 45 years, Kurdistan province has a local Sunni Kurd, Arash Zerehtan, as its governor. Similarly, in Sistan-Baluchistan, the appointment of Mansur Bijar as the province’s first Sunni Baluch governor was widely praised.
Acknowledging the socio-political challenges of Sistan-Baluchistan, the country’s most deprived region, Pezeshkian made it his first provincial destination after taking office. A noteworthy aspect of this trip was his meeting with Molana Abdolhamid, the influential Sunni leader from Zahedan. Since the protests of September 2022 and the Bloody Friday events, Abdolhamid had adopted a more critical stance toward the authorities and refrained from meeting officials publicly, reflecting the province’s deep discontent with Tehran. However, Abdolhamid described his meeting with Pezeshkian as a positive step, signaling the new president’s willingness to engage with marginalized communities.
It is worth noting that Pezeshkian is not the first Iranian president to visit Sistan-Baluchistan early in his term. Both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, after his reelection in 2008, and Hassan Rouhani made similar trips, highlighting the province’s geopolitical significance. The strategic importance of Sistan-Baluchistan, particularly regarding the development of the Chabahar port, the ongoing gas pipeline project with Pakistan, and its valuable mineral resources, makes it a focal point for Tehran. However, as history has shown, these development projects cannot succeed without addressing the deep-seated societal issues and grievances affecting the region’s local population.
Through these steps, Pezeshkian has demonstrated his approach to ethno-confessional inclusion, balancing symbolic appointments with strategic engagement. Yet, whether these measures can bring about meaningful change in Iran’s marginalized communities remains to be seen.
The Limitations of Pezeshkian’s Policies
In the context of heightened tensions between Iran and Israel, particularly following the conflict in Gaza, maintaining domestic stability, especially in border regions, becomes vital for Iranian authorities. Ensuring stability at home not only prevents internal conflicts but also strengthens Iran’s position in a potential wider regional conflict. By incorporating Sunnis into domestic politics and addressing their concerns, the authorities aim to create a more cohesive front, thereby preparing for external challenges amid complex regional dynamics. This strategic consideration adds another layer to understanding Pezeshkian’s domestic policies within the broader geopolitical context.
This approach is not without its challenges. Critics within Iran argue that focusing on religious and ethnic elites might inadvertently stir ethnic awareness and tensions, risking national unity and possibly fueling separatist movements. This fear, rooted in Iran’s history, prompts calls for a citizenship-based approach that doesn’t privilege ethnic identity in state affairs. Furthermore, the presence of extremist groups like Jaish al-Adl complicates this dynamic, challenging the state’s ability to address threats without broader public engagement. While Pezeshkian’s efforts include symbolic gestures, such as appointing Sunnis to government positions, deeper integration into sensitive areas like security forces and high-level decision-making remains limited. This precariousness means that while elites might leverage moments of inclusion to their advantage, the long-term impact on state-society relations remains uncertain.
Some Critical Notes
Iran’s ethno-religious landscape is complex, and this diversity has long influenced its politics. Since the Pahlavi era, there has been a notable shift where Sunni religious elites have increasingly become the primary representatives of their communities, overshadowing other voices. Pezeshkian’s approach, focusing primarily on engaging with these religious leaders, seems to bundle various ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups under a single category. While this strategy may offer short-term gains in stability and influence for both the state and the Sunni leadership, it risks marginalizing other non-religious and less influential voices within these communities. This could ultimately limit the effectiveness of the policies, as they fail to address the diverse needs and aspirations of Iran’s multifaceted population.
Pezeshkian appointed Mahmud Alavi, a Shiite cleric and former Minister of Intelligence under Hassan Rouhani, as his advisor and head of the Council of Ethnic and Religious Affairs. This appointment mirrors Hassan Rouhani’s own decision during his presidency to assign another former intelligence minister to the same role, reflecting a pattern in Iran’s approach to managing its ethno-religious diversity.
Appointing a Shiite cleric with a background in intelligence, such as Alavi, to oversee religious, ethnic, and confessional minority affairs illustrates a continuity in Iran’s governance mindset. This choice suggests that the state views its diverse population primarily through a religious framework, emphasizing the role of religious authority figures as intermediaries. Additionally, the appointment of a former intelligence chief highlights the persistent prioritization of security considerations when addressing the country’s internal diversity. While this strategy aims to ensure stability, it may not fully account for the complexities of Iran’s ethnic and cultural mosaic. By focusing on security frameworks, this approach risks sidelining the diverse needs and aspirations of various subgroups within Iranian society, potentially limiting its effectiveness in fostering genuine inclusivity.
As Iran stands at a critical juncture, balancing regional conflicts and internal diversity, Pezeshkian’s policies reflect a complex interplay of inclusivity and security. The success of these efforts will largely depend on the administration’s ability to genuinely incorporate the voices of all segments of society, moving beyond religious and security frameworks to embrace Iran’s tapestry of identities.
