What Happened in Syria? What Comes Next?

What are the outlooks for the reintegration of Syria within the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East?

Amidst a broader trend of normalization in the Middle East, the Syrian civil war has reached a standstill, largely due to the fatigue of external parties regarding the conflict, which has failed to achieve its intended goals. The reintegration of Syria has been a prominent focus of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Jordan, the latter of which is Syria’s immediate neighbor, culminating in Syria’s re-admittance to the Arab League in 2023. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which were previously recognized for their substantial support of anti-Assad factions, have redirected their attention to the regional integration of the government in recent years. The GCC states have not yet achieved their objective, as the Assad regime remains intact, and Iran’s influence within the country has increased in recent years.

Three nations—Russia, Iran, and Türkiye—initiated the Astana process in 2017, which fundamentally influenced the internal dynamics of Syria. The US, having contemplated military intervention in Syria in 2013 due to the Assad regime’s deployment of chemical weapons, has progressively distanced itself from the situation there, particularly following the defeat of the Islamic State. Previously, Washington provided support and armaments to the Kurdish forces, specifically the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However, since 2019, its attention has shifted away from the complexities of the Syrian internal situation.

It is a misconception to claim that the Assad administration has restored Syria’s sovereignty, as, until very recently, it continued as a multifaceted tapestry of entities: 

1. 1. Damascus, Homs, Hamas, and Aleppo are the most densely populated cities that were under the regime’s jurisdiction.
   2. Ankara maintains jurisdiction over the buffer zone adjacent to the Turkish-Syrian border in the northern region, a result of several Turkish interventions starting in 2016.
   3. The Syrian Democratic Forces administer the de facto autonomous Kurdish region known as Rojava.
   4. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, along with various other rebel factions, controls the city of Idlib and its surrounding areas, home to approximately 4 million inhabitants.
   5. The Al-Tanf military facility and deconfliction zone in Southeast Syria hosts a contingent of 900 military personnel from the United States (US).
   6. Approximately 1,500 Russian forces are stationed at the Khmeimim air base near Lattakia and the Russian naval base in Tartus.

Consequently, the Astana process has enabled Moscow to clearly define the distinctions between the territories held by the rebels, those governed by the state, and the regions occupied by Türkiye. Ankara and Moscow’s accord contributed to preserving the fragile equilibrium from 2020 to 2024.

The rebels’ successful offensive was determined by two critical factors: the regime’s fragmentation, as evidenced by the abrupt collapse of its military forces, and the absence of support from external supporters of the Assad regime, including Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Assad and his family have sought refuge in Moscow.

In the wake of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that began in February 2022, Russia found itself necessitated to withdraw its S-300 mobile surface-to-air missile system and ground forces, yet it continued to uphold its obligation regarding the security of Syrian airspace. Iran has remained preoccupied with its own security after the Israeli strikes. Hezbollah has exhibited signs of deterioration in recent weeks. In contrast, Türkiye has granted permission for the HTS to penetrate Damascus and undermine the existing regime. Numerous sources suggest that Qatar has made substantial financial contributions to the HTS, an Islamist movement.

Who are the Rebels?

The HTS, originating from the Nusra Front, a derivative of the Al-Qaeda network, has been instrumental in the ongoing insurgent movement. The Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra) represents a global jihadist entity whose ideological framework, akin to that of the Islamic State, seeks to establish a caliphate grounded in Islamic tenets. Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of the HTS, who endured six years of captivity by the US, severed ties with al-Qaeda in 2016 and established a new entity that incorporated various Islamist groups alongside the Nusra Front. The HTS adopted a measured Islamist stance in its discourse, advocating for the safeguarding of the Christian minority and the unimpeded practice of religion (Islam officially acknowledges the so-called religions of the book, in contrast to the actions of the Islamic State). The HTS successfully established a viable economic enclave and a clandestine governance structure, known as the Salvation Government, in Idlib, all while simultaneously abandoning its global goals. Julani has consistently articulated his objective to dismantle the Assad regime through military means while also advocating for the repatriation of Syrian refugees and the creation of a new, inclusive political framework grounded in Islamic principles.

HTS is classified as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union (EU), and Türkiye, despite its attempt at moderation. Julani has been officially classified as a “Special Terrorist” in the US, and there is a bounty placed on his capture. Julani and HTS members expressed their elation upon the news of Israel’s elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. However, the HTS is not the sole rebel faction operating in Syria. An illustrative case is the Syrian National Army, the designation under which a Turkish-supported rebel faction functions within the Idlib area. In the annals of recent history, the US and various allies played a pivotal role in the establishment of the Free Syrian Army; nevertheless, this is now a matter of the past. The collective objective of the various rebel factions engaged in Syria is the dismantling of the Assad regime. Nonetheless, their political perspectives diverge significantly, and they champion a distinct form of governance.

A Revitalized Political Transition? What is to Be Expected from the Insurgents?

The Assad regime’s resistance has significantly stalled the political transition in Syria, which began within the context of the Astana process. Assad viewed numerous rebel factions as terrorists, seeking to undermine their legitimacy to obstruct their involvement in the genuine political transition advocated by Western nations, citing the resolutions of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the purported Geneva Process. The Assad regime, the UN, and the opposition each appointed 50 members of the 150-member Syrian Constitutional Committee in 2019. However, its accomplishments have been minimal. Despite the Committee’s eight meetings up to 2022, none of them have yielded any noteworthy outcomes.

The Assad regime has positioned itself as the legitimate authority in Syria, a narrative further solidified by the presidential elections held in 2021. Nevertheless, this depiction is misleading, as the areas governed by Assad have undergone a significant economic and humanitarian crisis in recent years. The economy has predominantly depended on the production of captagon and its distribution to the Gulf region via neighboring Jordan, with limited external support for humanitarian initiatives. The US has implemented sanctions against Assad in accordance with the rigorous provisions of the Caesar Act.

The HTS advocates for a political transition characterized by democratic principles, engaging all insurgent factions in the process. On the morning of 8 December, Syria’s prime minister advocated for a dialogue and a political transition between the government and the rebels. Nevertheless, the subsequent questions regarding the political transition remain challenging to address:

1. 1. Does the HTS possess the requisite governance capacity to effectively organize public services within its jurisdiction and establish a viable economic system?
   2. Will the HTS attain external legitimacy, enabling it to negotiate agreements with external entities and promote political transition and economic advancement? Currently, it is concerning that the Taliban government in Afghanistan has released a favorable statement regarding the HTS. The HTS remains classified as a terrorist organization at this time.
   3. To what extent can the HTS moderation be interpreted as a strategic maneuver, and to what degree does it reflect genuine intent?
   4. What is the viewpoint of external entities regarding an Islamist government, such as the HTS?

The HTS has certainly functioned in the city of Idlib and its surroundings as a quasi-government; however, neither the HTS nor other entities can be classified as democratic organizations, suggesting that another authoritarian regime is likely to arise. The ascent of Islamist factions beyond the borders of Türkiye and Qatar is met with skepticism by regional stakeholders. The prospect of national reconciliation remains uncertain, as does the potential impact of the de-Baathification process, which significantly influenced the Iraqi uprising, on the situation in Syria. The economic landscape, coupled with ethnic disparities, presents significant challenges. The nation has been under the influence of the minority Alawites since the 1960s, and the HTS is contemplating its stance on Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq. The ideological divergences among the insurgent factions regrettably encompass the prospect of a resurgence of armed conflict over the control of Damascus.

The Geopolitics of Post-Assad Syria

The disintegration of the Assad regime and the ensuing presence of the HTS in Damascus predominantly correspond with Türkiye’s strategic objectives. Erdoğan has persistently expressed his steadfast endorsement for the removal of the Assad regime, particularly in light of the unsuccessful reconciliation efforts. Türkiye aims to enable the return of more than three million Syrian refugees currently within its territory—a decision that has faced opposition from the Assad administration. Ankara aims to restrict the Kurdish-controlled autonomous region in northern Syria from acting as a fundamental support base for the PKK. Erdoğan underscores the importance of dismantling the Kurdish autonomous region and expresses strong opposition to any federalization similar to that seen in Iraq.

In addition to Türkiye, the developments in Syria hold significant implications for Israel’s security. On one hand, it is indeed favorable that a regime opposing the peace treaty with the Jewish state is experiencing a decline. The decline of the Assad regime undermines the Iranian-led axis of resistance, thereby jeopardizing Tehran’s influence in the Middle East. Hezbollah may encounter challenges regarding the transportation of arms via Syrian territory, potentially fostering a prolonged ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel. Conversely, the destabilization of Syria and the ascendance of a faction previously associated with the al-Qaeda network in Damascus shifts the equilibrium in the opposite direction. Israel has declared its intention to bolster its border defenses, while Julani has suggested a vision of a future characterized by harmonious coexistence with Israel. The Islamist surge that followed the Arab Spring has diminished, with Hamas in the Gaza Strip representing its final stronghold, culminating in the terrorist attack of October 2023.

The HTS may find common ground with Russia; historically, Moscow has not been adamant about Assad’s leadership. However, it is important to note that they will align with Iran as adversaries. Tehran presently finds itself incapable of mobilizing Shiite militias; however, this network might possess a remarkable resilience that may eventually be revitalized in conjunction with Hezbollah. 

The unfolding events have largely sidelined the Gulf States; with the notable exception of Qatar, the emergence of an Islamist-based government through armed conflict does not align with their interests. Nevertheless, it is improbable that they will engage in the conflict. 

For Washington, Syria holds little significance apart from its implications for Israel’s security; the primary focus lies instead on the rivalry between the US and China.

The relationship between China and the Assad regime has grown increasingly amicable, particularly in the wake of the president’s visit to Beijing in 2022 and his integration into the Belt and Road Initiative. Consequently, it is evident that Beijing lacks the inclination to allocate resources towards infrastructure in a state characterized by instability. 

However, the external entity that will subsequently provide support for Syria’s economic stability remains uncertain, as Türkiye lacks the capacity to fulfill this role. If the HTS manages to establish a government, will it be subjected to the same level of global political isolation as the Taliban has since 2021? 

Sustaining refugees in the absence of substantial external financial support is another critical issue for the HTS if it decides to repatriate them. 

The inquiries posed are currently difficult to address. Yet it is certain that a new phase of the Syrian civil conflict will commence on 8 December, and this iteration will unfurl in the absence of Assad.