With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, proxy forces as Iran’s vital assets in the region were weakened and destroyed.
After the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel and its severe consequences for the “Axis of Resistance,” including Hamas itself and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime as the only state actor (other than Iran) present in the “Axis of Resistance” completed the breakdown of this chain.
As the only state actor in the “Axis of Resistance,” Syria played a vital role in this axis in terms of geopolitical and logistical aspects. With the loss of Syria, Iran’s land connection to Hezbollah in Lebanon for sending weapons and money will be significantly impaired.
However, the Iranian regime is trying to question the argument that the “Axis of Resistance” has disappeared with the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Ayatollah Khamenei said in his first speech after the fall of the Assad regime, “Those who think that the resistance front has weakened after the fall of the Syrian government, which was pro-resistance, are deeply mistaken; because they fundamentally do not have a correct understanding of the resistance.”
He also tried to question the idea that regional developments and the fall of the Assad regime have weakened Iran. In this context, Ayatollah Khamenei said that those who consider regional events (the fall of the Assad regime) to have weakened Iran should understand that Iran is strong and powerful and will become more powerful.
However, with the fall of the Assad regime and the loss of Syria’s logistical role in strengthening the “Axis of Resistance,” including the ground shipment of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s re-equipment is facing major problems.
The toppling of the Assad regime means threatening the existence of the Islamic Republic’s proxy groups in the region, groups that, without the support of Damascus and the Assad regime, will lose their ability to survive and continue their activities.
Iran considered its presence and influence in Syria a sign of its strategic depth, and Hassan Nasrallah, the former Secretary General of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, also considered the survival of Bashar al-Assad’s government to guarantee the survival of the struggle for the liberation of the Palestinian territories.
However, for Iran, despite the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas and the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which led to Syria’s withdrawal from the “Axis of Resistance,” Yemen remains a strong element of the “Axis of Resistance.” According to Ayatollah Khamenei, Yemen will triumph over its enemies.
Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a former member of the National Security Commission of the Iran parliament, says, “The fall of the Syrian government is not the defeat of the resistance. Resistance against Israel is a genuine movement that exists in Palestine and Lebanon.”
Despite Iran’s efforts to downplay the regional developments, it is important to note that the regional equations have changed to Iran’s disadvantage. With the fall of the Assad regime, Iran has lost one of the main pillars of its “Shiite Crescent,” and the land corridor that Tehran used to arm Hezbollah and expand its influence in Lebanon and throughout the Levant has been cut off. Iran’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is likely to diminish, as it has lost its key leverage. Iran will now be forced to back down or even accelerate efforts to outrun the nuclear threshold in order to compensate for its declining regional power.
In the new equation, Turkey has gained a stronger and more prominent role in the region, and its influence in Iraq and Lebanon is likely to increase. With a large population of Syrian refugees and a desire to expand its influence in Syria against Iran, Turkey now has the opportunity to suppress Kurdish forces and return some of the Syrian refugees.
The success of the opposition groups in forming a government that represents all segments of the Syrian people is a crucial factor in stabilizing Syria and securing Turkey’s interests. This agreement will allow Turkey to help with reconstruction, strengthen its economic and political ties with the new Syria, and facilitate the voluntary return of Syrian refugees to their country. All of this will reduce domestic pressures on Turkey and strengthen its social and economic stability.
However, the Kurdish issue will remain a significant challenge for Ankara. Internationally backed Kurdish forces are likely to seek to expand their influence in northeastern Syria in the wake of the government vacuum in Syria, especially if US support for the Kurdish forces continues, which would raise concerns about the formation of an independent Kurdish state near its borders. Accordingly, Turkey will continue to try to counter Kurdish influence by strengthening its military and political presence in the border areas. It will also seek to coordinate with the new Syrian government to contain these threats and ensure its national security.
If the new Syrian government does not reach a favorable agreement and is dragged into internal conflicts, Turkey is likely to face a complex scenario that includes continued chaos at its borders and a new wave of refugees. This will prevent it from achieving its goals. Accordingly, the opposition’s success in presenting a sustainable and comprehensive governance model is the main guarantee of avoiding chaos and a long-term strategic partnership between Turkey and the new Syria.
On the other hand, Turkey’s gains in Syria could be worrisome for the entire region. For Arab countries – from Egypt and Jordan to the Gulf states – Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s victory in Syria is a dangerous echo of the Arab Spring, the uprisings that the monarchies thought they had put an end to. The Arab Spring challenged authoritarianism in the Arab world with calls for democracy and good governance.
Arab states, which have sought to reduce Iranian influence in Syria for years, may see the fall of Assad and Hezbollah as a strategic victory. Still, the emergence of Islamist groups or new instabilities could also be challenging for them.
This concern led Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic advisor to the president of the United Arab Emirates, to say after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, “We have to wait and see what happens in Syria after this. The only way is for a credible government to come to power. The main concern now is the preservation and integrity of Syria’s territory, which is under threat. Iran remains an important player in the region, and we should use this opportunity to talk to this country about the region.”
Accordingly, Iran may move closer to countries such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia to confront Turkey. Despite this, the Persian Gulf Arabs are unwilling to engage with Turkey in the region. In other words, the closeness of Iran and the Persian Gulf Arabs, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, should not be exaggerated. In a new regional order centered on Turkey, the tendency of the Gulf Arab States to this new regional order is understandable, with a sense of insecurity arising from the decrease in the presence of the United States and the change in the balance of power in the region. In addition, the weakening of proxy groups supported by Iran will also make them happy.
Meanwhile, Turkey is also seeking to provide assurances to Gulf Arabs about the future government of Syria. Turkish officials are trying to avoid making the mistakes of the “Arab Spring” era in the 2010s that plunged the region into further turmoil. Hence, they acknowledge the importance of regional allies and Western powers in helping to stabilize Syria. To that end, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan intends to work with Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE – which are also skeptical of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood – to gain their sustained support for Syria’s future.
Israel is happy to see the weakening of the Iranian-led alliance with the fall of the Assad regime, as it can isolate Hezbollah from Syria and completely cut off the resistance-centric communications network that ran through Syria, which would strengthen Israel’s dominance in the Levant. Although Israel benefits from Iran’s weakness in Syria, it still has security concerns about the possible rise of Islamist groups after Assad.
After consolidating its power in Syria, a government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has rejected Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights and is unlikely to remain neutral on the plight of the Palestinians. The Sunni Arab ties of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to the Palestinians are undeniable.
This could explain why the Israeli military has launched a massive air campaign across Syria, seeking to destroy Syria’s strategic weapons stockpiles, fearing that these weapons could be used against it in a future confrontation with the new government in Damascus.
In relation to the Syrian Kurds, Israel’s strategy is aligned with broader regional goals, including supporting Kurds in Syria. Israeli officials have openly expressed their interest in strengthening ties with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a group affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that is designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, the European Union, NATO, and others. This support threatens to further embroil Syria in regional conflicts, particularly with Turkey, and deepen its internal divisions. This potential involvement risks inflaming tensions between Syrian ethnic groups, complicating reconstruction efforts, and alienating Syrians who are already wary of foreign manipulation.
Turkey, a key regional player, sees the YPG as an existential threat. Any cooperation between Israel and the YPG would strain relations between Israel and Turkey and potentially escalate into a wider regional conflict. Such tensions could further destabilize Syria, as outside powers exploit the chaos to advance their own agendas.
On the other hand, in a meeting with members of the ruling body in Syria, the United States emphasized preventing Iran’s renewed influence in Syria.
The United States, Israel, and some regional countries do not want Iran to once again arm the “Axis of Resistance” by influencing Syria and pose a threat to Israel from this country.
Accordingly, the regional order has been shaped to the detriment of Iran and the “Axis of Resistance.” In such an order, it does not seem that the competition between the Persian Gulf Arabs and Turkey will be to the extent that we will witness coalitions after the Arab Spring. On the other hand, with the cessation of the Gaza war, the process of normalizing Arab-Israeli relations will continue. Trump’s presence in the White House and his pressure on his Arab allies will cause this process to be pursued with greater speed.
