The Arab Gulf states will continue their diplomatic efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Syria. However, reaching this goal will require mutual commitment, patience, and a clear plan – elements that are crucial not only for realizing the vision of a united and stable Syria but also for the stability of the broader Middle East region.
With the collapse of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024, a new incentive – the emergence of a “New Syria” – has been added to the Middle Eastern transforming order. Nonetheless, the uncertainty surrounding the ceasefire’s endurance in the Gaza Strip and the unpredictable policy of President Donald Trump exacerbates the situation. The interim President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ahmad al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Julani, has been working to form a new government and establish the foundations of political structures in the country. In late February, Syria launched its National Dialogue Conference. However, few details were provided, aside from discussions on the vision for a provisional constitution and hosting a series of workshops, the discussions of which remained off the record. Participants of the event condemned Israel’s attacks on Syria’s buffer zone and discussed human rights, an issue that is also at the center of the international community’s attention. As Al-Jazeera reported on March 13, Al-Sharaa enacted a temporary constitution that is expected to remain in effect for a transitional period of five years. The President holds executive power and oversees the ongoing processes. However, it will take significant time for Syria to become a strong actor free of internal disputes and divisions. Given that Syria has been grappling with long-term socio-economic issues, the task is even more challenging to accomplish in a short period of time.
For the past three months, Syrian diplomacy has actively engaged in regional dialogue with the Arab states. The abrupt transition caused concern among their leaders. Therefore, diplomatic engagement with Syria’s leader was critical to envision a new path toward anticipated stability and security. Although the Gulf Cooperation Council’s official statementsexpress a joint will and stance on “achieving a just and sustainable peace in Syria,” it is also crucial to delve into the bilateral ties between the Arab Gulf states and Damascus and assess how their relationship might develop.
Arab Gulf States and Syria in a post-Arab Spring Era
The events of the so-called Arab Spring revealed that, despite the initial common position proclaimed by the GGC regarding security and the growing Iranian activity across the region, the roles of the Arab Gulf states soon diverged and took on different dimensions. Although the Gulf countries shifted toward a more assertive foreign policy, the differences in their approaches to Syria became evident, particularly among the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Each state, active at various levels, supported different groups, reflecting their own interests and concerns for national security. Riyadh, for instance, was wary of Iran’s increasing influence, as Iranian authorities were strong supporters of Bashar al-Assad. Abu Dhabi, on its part, disapproved of the growing regional activity of Islamist factions such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which threatened their domestic stability. Authorities in Doha also opposed the Assad regime and were reported to assist actors that were affiliated with political Islam, which met with condemnation from their Gulf neighbors. While Arab support for the political opposition groups in Syria appeared coordinated (it is worth adding that Oman remained neutral in the conflict and focused on providing humanitarian aid), Will Todman noticed that “GCC members’ apparent unity on Syria policy was short-lived.” The question of who should be supported in Syria became another point of congestion.
Altea Pelicoli illustrates another example of different approaches to the conflict in her paper, which discusses Qatari and Emirati foreign aid in the second decade of the 21st century. Qatar supported governorates in Syria that were not under the regime’s control, while the UAE provided aid through United Nations agencies and sent direct assistance to the Syrian government. The aid distributed by the UAE to countries in crisis represents one of the “pillars of the UAE foreign policy,” in line with its principles of tolerance and co-existence, as emphasized by the government.
In Qatar’s Foreign Policy: Geography, Politics and Strategy since 1971, Marwan Kabalan points to three distinctive axes that highlight the Syrian domestic competition between regional actors: the Iran-Shiite-Iraqi-Militias-Hezbollah-Syria axis, the Saudi-Emirati axis, and the Qatar-Turkey axis (Kabalan 2024, 99). The intra-GCC division was evident, revealing the lack of unanimity and various perceptions of threats. This division was exemplified by the rupture between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and Qatar due to its reported support for Islamist groups. This rift was repeated three years later, leading to severing ties with Doha. However, no one anticipated that by the end of the second decade of the 21st century, the regional order would shift, and former rivals and enemies would become strategic partners. The uncertain future of the United States in the Middle East was another key factor behind these changes.
Syria – Arab Gulf States Relations Entering a New Reality
The difference between the Arab Gulf states’ approach represented varying interests towards Syria. It must be stated that in the last few years preceding the downfall of Assad’s regime, the change within the regional Middle Eastern order was becoming more visible. The UAE diplomats initiated dialogue with their Syrian counterparts and endorsed the notion of readmitting Syria to the Arab League, a process that was completed in 2023. However, Qatar abstained from supporting Syria’s endeavor into the organization, stating that “[Qatar’s] individual decision is not to take any step if there is no political development or solution to the crisis.”
In 2019, both Bahrain and the UAE reopened their embassies in Syria, and within two years, Manama appointed its ambassador to Damascus. From 2021 to 2023, Abu Dhabi and Damascus engaged in high-level exchanges, expressing a will to explore “new horizons for this cooperation, especially in vital sectors, in order to strengthen investment partnerships in these sectors.” The UAE’s foreign policy aligns with the principles of peaceful strategy towards the region and beyond.
Oman, on its part, was the first Gulf state to reinstate its ambassador to Damascus in November 2020.
Following the example set by Bahrain and the UAE, Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic ties in 2023 and reopened its embassy in Syria in September 2024.
Qatar and Kuwait began pursuing similar diplomatic initiatives, although this occurred only after the collapse of Assad’s rule. The Foreign Ministry of Qatar emphasized that the state expresses the commitment “to actively contributing to regional and international efforts to achieve a transitional political process that ensures the unity, sovereignty, and stability of Syrian territories […],” therefore a secure, stable future could be achieved. Kuwait, on its part, is reported to reopen its embassy in Syria in the foreseeable future.
The Arab states shared similar approaches regarding the rapid change in the domestic political stage of Syria on December 8, 2024. Security was the main issue addressed in official government statements, reflecting past concerns that accompanied previous events in the region. UAE authorities expressed concern over extremism and terrorism, adding that non-state actors must not be given the chance to take advantage of political voids. For their part, Saudi Arabia and Qatar emphasized an urgent need to prevent the state from falling into another crisis. The Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, H.E. Jasem Mohamed al-Budaiwi, stressed the GCC’s countries’ “unwavering stance on the ongoing situation, reaffirming their commitment to the crisis in Syria, the preservation of its territorial integrity, and respect for its independence and sovereignty.”
The issue of lifting sanctions and security came up several times during high-level talks. The topic was addressed during a meeting between the US and the UAE on December 2, 2024. It was suggested that these sanctions could be lifted if Syria takes steps to distance itself from Iran. It didn’t take long for the change to occur – Iran’s primary support, the leader of Syria, has fallen, significantly diminishing Tehran’s influence. At the same time, it has caused additional concern among the Gulf states about what would happen next with Syria.
The topic of sanctions has once more gained prominence after the fall of Assad, during the GCC ministers’ extraordinary ministerial meeting on December 26, 2024, in Kuwait, and the Riyadh Meetings on Syria on January 12, 2025 (Saudi Arabia), bringing together the Arab, European, and American foreign ministers and representatives. According to the Saudi Press Agency, Saudi Foreign Minister (FM) Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud highlighted “the importance of lifting sanctions on Syria and welcomed the U.S. decision to issue General License 24, which provides exemptions related to sanctions. Minister Faisal bin Farhan urged the international community to lift unilateral and international sanctions on Syria and to expedite humanitarian, economic, and capacity-building support”. Arab leaders addressed the situation in Syria, highlighting collective support for the state’s unity and stability. In a later statement, published on March 8, the GCC reiterated its “stance against violence, terrorism, and criminal activities, irrespective of their motivations.”
The territorial integrity of Syria has been violated by Israel, which has continued attacks on the country since December 2024, contradicting international law and threatening to further destabilize this part of the region. The use of force was condemned by the GCC Ministerial Council.
In addition to the discussion initiated by regional leaders, attention should also be given to the bilateral meetings that have taken place over the past three months. Syria’s Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, announced in early January that he would pay visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Jordan. Syria’s top diplomat held talks with Qatari diplomats, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, during which they discussed matters of utmost importance, including lifting sanctions on Syria by the United States. Later in January, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, accompanied by the defense and foreign ministers, paid an official visit to Syria, meeting with the transitional President al-Sharaa. Following the pledges made during the meetings, in March, the Qataris initiated a gas supply through Jordan to Syria, thereby ensuring the provision of electricity.
President al-Sharaa made his first foreign official visit to Saudi Arabia on February 2 and met with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. According to Al-Jazeera, the Syrian head of state expressed hope in Riyadh’s future efforts “in supporting Syria in building its future.” The President also mentioned potential fields of cooperation, including energy, technology, education, and health. The UAE Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister H.H. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Foreign Minister al-Shibani discussed Syria-UAE bilateral relations, stressing the importance of Syria’s independence and sovereignty on Syria’s FM visit to the UAE in January. A month later, the diplomats met during the World Governments Summit in Dubai, underscoring the “importance of advancing the path of reconstruction and development in Syria, and ensuring all necessary factors for security and stability to secure a promising future filled with opportunities for prosperity and well-being for its people.” Syria’s efforts to establish stable state institutions within the framework set by authorities in Damascus were underscored by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait,which welcomed the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the institutions of the Syrian Arab Republic.
Outlook
The emergence of a “New Syria” in the Middle East appears to be a promising vision. However, it still requires significant time before we can speak of effective internal transformation. Syria needs to be rebuilt from the ground up, which demands establishing a robust economy, a stable state apparatus, an active and united society, and obtaining international recognition to become a vital and trustworthy partner, to name just a few factors. President al-Sharaa faces several challenges stemming from both domestic and regional circumstances. For instance, according to initial calculations, Syria needs at least $250bn- $400bn for the reconstruction of the state. The government requires international cooperation to attract foreign investment, which also necessitates the lifting of sanctions. This, in turn, leads to another major issue that must be addressed – security.
Looking back to the second decade of the 21st century, the Arab leaders took a different approach toward Syria for other conflicts that erupted in their vicinity, such as the one in Yemen, and varied perceptions of threats, which resulted in decreased interest. However, taking into consideration the systemic pressure (like the United States’ gradual withdrawal from the Middle East), they soon realized that a new order had begun to emerge. Thus, they chose to reintegrate Syria into the regional system. This did not last long enough to establish a new Middle East with Assad – the collapse of the regime came off guard.
The Arab Gulf states have engaged in diplomatic efforts to help Syria in its post-Assad struggle for a new beginning. The imminent reaction of the Gulf states – advocating for stability, peace and preventing the state from descending into another crisis – indicates that another potential conflict is unacceptable. Therefore, a proactive policy must be adopted.
Given the dynamics of events in the Middle East, a few scenarios can be discussed regarding the future of Syria-Arab Gulf state relations and its impact on the Middle East. The Emirati strategy, analyzed by Dr. Ebtesam el-Ketbi, the President of UAE’s Emirates Policy Center think-tank, serves as an example. The focus is on economic development as a means of achieving peace and security (El-Ketbi 2023, 83). If this is implemented in Syria, and whether political and economic institutions function effectively while foreign investment strengthens the economy, it could lead to domestic stability without the need to use force. It should be emphasized that these actions require an appropriate amount of time and an assessment of whether such solutions can be adopted by Syria’s government.
The Gulf countries have provided foreign aid and discussed the prospects of investments in sectors that require immediate reconstruction, marking a long-standing policy that could be the first step toward a better future. While the Gulf states may pursue individual approaches toward Syria, they share a common goal of achieving stability and peace. Any resurgence of terrorist activity poses another threat, as it would disrupt the region once again.
Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting on Syria that involved representatives from the region, Europe, and the US, signaling the developing leadership role in the state’s future. Given the capabilities of Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, along with their specific regional roles, such as mediators and peace brokers, these countries play a crucial role in shaping regional order. Therefore, they can contribute to achieving similar outcomes in Syria. Building a state under al-Sharaa leadership from the ground up requires not only international cooperation but also active efforts from the transitional government, which is gradually initiating steps to establish the foundations of statehood.
Geopolitics play a significant part in the regional dynamics. With the increased assertiveness of the Gulf states and their rapprochement with Türkiye, Israel, Iran, and Syria, the contemporary Middle Eastern order appears to be less fragile and less conflict-oriented. However, it is essential to remain mindful of the uncertainty surrounding the situation in the war-torn Gaza Strip and the ongoing quest for enduring peace. However, the transformation of regional order into one of amity does not indicate complete trust but rather a cooperation that also includes elements of competition. Since a new chapter in Syria’s history is currently unfolding, specific outcomes remain to be seen.
