On the occasion of the recent publication of The Iranian Security Apparatus by Walter Posch, which captures the most important known elements of Iran’s security framework, we present this interview that delves into the intricate evolution of Iran’s defense strategy from the early 20th century to the present day.
Our discussion spans across significant historical milestones, examining the continuity and changes in defense priorities from the Pahlavi era to the Islamic Republic. Walter Posch analyzes the profound impact of the Iran-Iraq War on current military doctrines, as well as the modernization efforts and strategic focus on asymmetric warfare. Moreover, we address the influence of external factors, international sanctions, and internal political dynamics on Iran’s defense posture, while considering the implications of its emerging commercial defense industry. Finally, the interview concludes with a forward-looking assessment of Iran’s strategic objectives, providing insights into the potential future directions of its defense policy. This comprehensive overview offers valuable perspectives for scholars and readers interested in the historical and contemporary aspects of Iran’s military strategy.
Historical Overview
Can you provide an overview of the historical evolution of Iran’s defense strategy since the early 20th century?
Well, there are indeed several strategies, the first and foremost common element is the strong will for national independence, regardless of the regime and time. I think Iranian strategists have all agreed on that over the course of the last century.
Two more elements should be added:
First, centralization in the sense of modernization, which put Tehran – or the central power in Tehran – at loggerheads with tribal and provincial elites, sometimes ending in the quelling of uprisings;
Second, after the Islamic revolution, we could see the will to forcefully impose an Islamist ideology upon society and to read strategic challenges through this lens – without forgoing the national interest.
Pahlavi to Post-Revolutionary Changes
How have Iran’s defense budget and priorities changed from the Pahlavi era to the post-revolutionary period? Are there any notable areas of continuity?
The continuity can be seen but also in the negative; the border troops, marzbani, for instance were always underfunded. Then, there was a focus on missile technology, which started under the Pahlavis, but they mainly focused on the Air Force, where an important part of the budget was spent. Cut off from the West, the Islamic Republic followed the missile path as an alternative to the Air Force. Also, the development of the Air Defense Forces as a new military branch is a novelty for Iran. A very strange continuation is, of course, the “regime army” – the Imperial Guard consisting of select troops and officers was there solely for the safety of the regime; a similar logic prevails with the Corps of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution or Revolutionary Guard.
Iran-Iraq War Impact
How did the experiences and outcomes of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) shape Iran’s current military doctrines and defense strategies?
The Iran-Iraq war created, in a way, the military of the Revolutionary Guard and balanced the Army’s (Artesh) military power. However, on the strategic level, Iran faced the same fate as any other revolutionary country: revolutionary fervor and fanaticism get you only to a certain point. Beyond that, revolutionary zeal may as well destroy one’s national resources or risk the nation’s survival. Hence the doctrine of expedient interests (maslahat-e nezam) was developed, which says that system survival is paramount. Hence, the Iranian behavior of verbal bombast and relations to almost all radicals but, ultimately, pragmatic nation-to-nation business.
Modernization and Asymmetric Warfare
Military Modernization
What steps has Iran taken to modernize its military capabilities, and what are the key focus areas after the war?
The main focus was on missile technology, battlefield and modern intelligence electronics, and, to a certain degree, naval technology. Some success was also achieved in the development of drones. But this did not change the basic outlook of Iran’s military hardware, like tanks, etc., which is basically aging and made of Western and Post-Soviet or Soviet material.
Asymmetric Warfare
How does Iran’s focus on asymmetric warfare shape its defense strategy, particularly in terms of missile capabilities and naval tactics in the Persian Gulf?
Iran added its experience from the 1960s and 1970s international guerilla underground, where some of the leading figures of the regime have been trained, to its Western-trained army. Elements like the Quds Force are noteworthy, but they differ only in the sense that they are experienced in working with those underground groups – or terrorists, if you want – Western forces would not cooperate with them. Whatever “new” battlefield tactics Iran developed in those years – such as the often quoted “guerilla at sea” tactic in the Persian Gulf – is outdated by now.
External Influences and Strategic Adjustments
External Factors
What external factors shape Iran’s defense strategy? For instance, some argue that the Abraham Accords have led to enhancements in missile technologies, such as hypersonic missiles. How do you see this influencing Iran’s strategy?
Not at all. Iran is a sanctioned country, so it could only invest in missile technology, where it had some technological breakthroughs. But these have to be put into perspective of the broader region. In my view, Turkey has had much bigger success with its investment in drone technology. I see no relations between the Abraham Accords and Iran’s military technology.
International Sanctions
What has been the impact of international sanctions on Iran’s military capabilities and defense strategy?
The main factor is that Iran had no access to Western technologies and finances, so it had to look for alternatives, including alternative partners. Iran’s missile technology is a direct result of the sanctions—at least, this is what we know at this point.
Internal Dynamics and Defense Industry
Internal Political Dynamics
How do internal political dynamics within Iran, including the relationship between the Army (Artesh) and the Revolutionary Guards, influence defense strategy? Which one is the key player, if it is possible to say?
I think the clerical regime managed to balance both elements and redundancies, like having several special forces units, by design, to minimize the risk of a coup d’etat. But of course, certain pressure groups always wish that one peculiar branch gets more funding or control over a well-funded military element, such as the missile force, which is now part of the Revolutionary Guard.
Commercial Defense Industry
Iran has been involved in selling drones to other countries, indicating a commercial aspect to its defense industry. How does this practice impact Iran’s overall defense strategy and capabilities?
Not at all. Iran’s commercial defense industry is especially strong in ammo, light and medium infantry weapons, and battlefield electronics, but I do not think Tehran is a great player in the international defense market. However, things may change, as you said with the drones, but who would buy them other than Russia?
Future Directions
Strategic Objectives
What are the key strategic objectives for Iran’s defense policy in the next decade?
Until recently, my argument would have been the following: Teheran wants maximum provocation for minimum consequences and beyond that to conduct business like an ordinary nation-state aspiring to be a regional power. Tehran follows a 4×3 strategy; four ideological principles (Iranian nationalism, traditional Shiism, revolutionary Islam called Khomeinism, and anti-imperialism – a legacy of the international Left of the 1970s) are applied in three regions (neighboring countries, the Middle East, and the global South). Iran applies these ideological postures usually to justify its actions in its immediate neighborhood, in the Middle East, as well as on the international stage, focusing on the so-called Global South (see Iran’s relations to South Africa). Iran also developed an “Axis of Resistance,” putting ideologically diverse groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas, or the Syrian regime into one framework against Israel – outwardly, because in reality, the same actors were anti-Saudi and helped Tehran strengthen its position towards Riyadh. Yet, nowadays, due to the escalation with Israel, it seems that push comes to shove: Tehran either accepts the humiliation of having been unable to prevent the assassination of Hamas leader Haniyeh and shrugs it off, which it cannot do, or it escalates further against Israel and thus, changes the Hamas-Israeli conflict and brings the US to the scene, forcing Washington to engage robustly on the Israeli side and to ponder serious military action against Iran. Until now, Supreme Leader Khamenei was able to prevent this, but in the end, it was his decision to focus on Israel-Palestine and Lebanon and to neglect the situation on the Eastern borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, from where well-trained drug bands are able to wage pitched battles against the underfunded border troops or marzbani.
Image source: Holy Defense Museum of Tehran. Available at: https://itto.org/iran/photogallery/Holy-Defense-Museum-Tehran/
