Abbas Araghchi, the new foreign minister of Iran, has a pragmatic view toward the new world order that implies “strengthening relations with China and Russia” on the one hand and, on the other hand, considers “de-escalation of tensions with the West.”
One of the primary influences on the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is its interpretation of the international order, which crucially impacts the important cases of Iran’s foreign policy. Currently, Iran’s foreign policy is dealing with numerous and complex cases, such as the nuclear issue, ways to advance international relations, including the ones with Iran’s immediate neighbors and improving relations with Europe, as well as interacting with global and regional organizations, and, of course, how to approach the Gaza war.
Like Masoud Pezeshkian, Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s new foreign minister, believes in the decline of the American hegemonic order in the international system. He believes that the global order based on law is failing against American unilateralism.
In Pezeshkian’s opinion, the current definition of the world order emphasizes the shift of power from the West to the East. This power shift has already occurred, and American hegemony has declined, but the new poles have not yet been established in the new world. Thus, he considers the new world order post-polar, and believes that there should be a balance between the East and West in Iran’s foreign policy.
Araghchi’s view of the new world order also considers a kind of balance between the East and West. He considers independence from any outer domination and the “Neither East nor West” doctrine—an important legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini—crucial aspects of Iranian diplomacy.
Araghchi has a pragmatic view of the world order. He believes that international relations are based on interests, and each country cooperates with or opposes other countries based on its interests. He views diplomacy as the art of aligning one’s interests with the interests of others: “If you cannot put the interests of others in the direction of your own interests, it is natural that they will go where they have more interests, and the art of diplomacy shows itself here. We used and continue to use this art in relations between East and West. Some mistakes may have been made, or we may have been too close to one side, but in my opinion, the ‘Neither East Nor West’ has made enough room for itself in our foreign policy, and we should continue in this direction.”
Therefore, Iran in the “post-polar world” simultaneously cooperates, competes, and builds networks in various fields. That is, if there is a disagreement with Western countries in one area, it does not necessarily mean that all Iranian governmental and non-governmental actors must have tension and competition with the West in other areas as well. In such a context, the Pezeshkian administration adheres to “strengthening relations with China and Russia” on the one hand and, on the other hand, considers “de-escalation of tensions with the West” as possible and desirable. Thus, the contradiction that may exist between these two policies in a “Cold War” approach is irrelevant to the philosophical approach of the Pezeshkian government to international relations.
Araghchi is one of the critics of the domestic opposition who questioned the political negotiations, including the nuclear negotiations. In response, he said that conversation and interaction are not the same as friendship. “Some people consider negotiation tactics in some places as a sign of friendship, but it is not a diplomat’s responsibility to recognize this expediency. Diplomats are subject to instructions from higher authorities,” he believes.
Views on the JCPOA
Araghchi was known as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency. During the past two decades, he has worked in various positions as director general and deputy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In recent years, he was the secretary of the strategic council.
Even when the nuclear negotiations were going on without Zarif’s presence, Araghchi promoted the negotiations on behalf of the establishment and not the Rouhani government.
This was at a time when Ayatollah Khamenei was severely critical of Zarif for his statements regarding the dominance of military institutions over diplomacy and considered his statements to be repeating the hostile words of enemies and Americans.
Zarif’s statements were made at the end of Rouhani’s government, and subsequently, the nuclear negotiations were carried out by Araghchi without his presence. Araghchi is trusted by the leader of Iran in the nuclear negotiations.
Araghchi’s view on the JCPOA comes back to his view on political negotiations, which he explained in his book titled “The Power of Negotiation: Principles and Rules of Political and Diplomatic Negotiations.”
In this book, he describes the concept of political negotiation from different perspectives. Araghchi writes: “Negotiation actually means a deal; you have to give something to get something. It is not the case that in the process of negotiations, one side only gives points, and the other side takes points all the time; it is a mutual process. If one-sided scoring is formed in negotiations, it is no longer called negotiation; rather, it is the submission of one party to the other party.”
From his point of view, political negotiation becomes necessary when a difference or a problem between two or more actors prevents them from achieving specific goals. Political negotiation begins when the cost of not negotiating is greater than the cost of negotiating. “Political negotiation, like any other negotiation, is considered a more accessible, less expensive and less risky way to reach specific goals; Sometimes it is the only way, and there is no alternative,” he believes. For Araghchi, “negotiation time” is essential. He believes that a professional diplomat should be able to recognize when, in front of which issues, and to what extent he should be flexible and when not. “Timely flexibility on the part of the actors reduces the possibility of negotiation deadlock. The successful diplomat uses the opportunities that arise in a moment and will not lose them in the hope of achieving better opportunities.” In February 2023, he said: “In diplomacy, one should not go too far into options that are not due yet. Now, in foreign policy, the work field is not yet closed enough to consider very specific scenarios. I still think there are better options.”
From Araghchi’s view, the JCPOA has had three main benefits for the Islamic Republic of Iran: First, it removed the sanctions imposed against Iran. Second, it gave international legitimacy to Iran’s nuclear program; the program was prohibited by the United Nations Security Council according to Resolution 1929 but became a legitimate international program, including enrichment rights, according to Resolution 2231. Thirdly, securitizing Iran’s nuclear program: the project that presented Iran as a threat to the world gained an entirely new image.
According to Araghchi, the United States‘ withdrawal from the JCPOA resulted in the loss of the first benefit, the removal of sanctions, but the other two benefits are still valid.
From Araghchi’s point of view, one of the goals of politicizing Iran’s nuclear program is securitizing the country, which should be changed. He claims that the project of defamation, securitization, and delegitimization of the Islamic Republic is very dangerous since it affects Iran’s interests: “The hands of the Zionists are behind these cases. They are trying to present Iran as a threat and an unacceptable system. This affects our foreign relations and reduces our cooperation with other countries.”
Araghchi believes that there is a clear difference between the JCPOA debate and missile testing; he does not consider missile testing a violation of the JCPOA. According to him, the JCPOA caused the separation of the missile issue, which had been tied to the nuclear issue by the West.
However, after Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran held talks with four European countries regarding Yemen. In May 2018, Araghchi said that Iran had only entered into negotiations on the issue of Yemen with four countries – France, England, Germany, and Italy – due to humanitarian reasons and the poor conditions of the Yemeni people, and the issue is entirely separate from the path of nuclear negotiations. “Other than that, we have no negotiations, and the missile issue is our red line,” he said.
From Araghchi’s view, the missile program is one of the critical axes of deterrence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the same time, he believes that military capabilities such as missile power leave the hands of diplomats free in negotiations to impose their demands. He said, “If we are now very confident about our security, it is because of the deterrence power that we created in the defense industry. The fact that none of the neighbors or other powers even think of attacking Iran is because of its deterrent power.” Araghchi considers missile power to be one of the primary components of Iran’s power: “It was our missiles that did not allow anyone to attack our nuclear facilities. We are forever indebted to the blood of nuclear scientists and rocket scientists who strengthened us.”
In addition, from his point of view, the “Axis of Resistance” is another aspect of Iran’s deterrence power and strategic depth. He believes the “Axis of Resistance” has given Iran the power of regional presence and influence in the field of diplomacy. This means that Iran is now a power that can pursue its own ideals in the region.
Araghchi considers the nuclear negotiations an example of not falling under the West’s domination: “The West said that we are worried about your nuclear program and that you should stop it. We resisted, and it was our strength that we did not succumb to their words of force.”
In general, Araghchi has a pragmatic view toward the international system and nuclear talks. He does not consider dialogue and diplomacy taboo and believes they should be used to pursue national interests. However, he considers timing crucial and believes that “we should talk with strong hands,” while military capability is crucial in strengthening Iran’s hands for negotiations.
Image Credit: Hamed Malekpour, Tasnim News. Available at: https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/media/1398/04/16/2048404/نشست-خبری-گام-دوم-کاهش-تعهدات-ایران-در-برجام#photo=4
