The Assad regime’s downfall in Syria is the first symptom of a regional power shift following Israel’s war on Hezbollah in Lebanon, highlighting the close ties between the two nations. While Iran emerged as the loser, Turkey and Israel gained the most. Ultimately, Syrians stand to benefit the most, but capitalizing on this opportunity requires wisdom and learning from past lessons.
Introduction
The unexpected downfall of the Syrian regime took the region and the world by surprise. After 54 years of Baathist rule and following 13 years of unrest and civil war, one of the most brutal totalitarian regimes in modern history that was responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths witnessed a fulgurant collapse.
Unusual in the region’s dystopian reality, particularly amidst the ongoing suffering in Gaza over the past year, were the scenes of jubilant celebration in the streets of Damascus on Sunday, December 8. Euphoric crowds filled the streets, marking the collapse of Assad’s Baathist regime in Syria.
While the downfall was likely mediated by regional powers, the events unfolded just 10 days after a U.S.-negotiated ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel took effect. It came as a first symptom of the significant shift in the regional balance of power following the weakening of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance.” Israel’s massive and aggressive campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon forced the group to redeploy its forces from Syria back to Lebanon, leaving a crippled and weak Syrian Army alone against the opposition forces.
The opposition forces led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – formerly Al-Nusra Front – grabbed this golden opportunity and launched a massive counter-offensive against areas held by the regime, which ended by overtaking the Syrian capital Damascus without much resistance.
The cascading events provide a clear example of the intricate link between the two neighboring countries and their intertwined fronts, which have long shared a common fate shaped by mutual and interconnected influences. However, this dynamic is not new. It represents just another chapter in the deeply connected histories of the two nations.
Cross-Border Celebrations
On Sunday, December 8, neighboring Lebanon also erupted in street celebrations and political euphoria. These scenes contrasted sharply with the previous two months of destruction and death caused by Israel’s unprecedented aggression on Lebanon in its war against the Shia militant group Hezbollah.
Scenes of jubilant crowds across Lebanon celebrating the regime’s collapse were widely shared on television screens and social media. Syrians were joined by thousands of Lebanese who did not forget years of repression under 29 years of Syrian military presence in Lebanon that ended in 2005. Some Lebanese even remained in captivity right up until the regime’s fall and were liberated on Sunday. In fact, various Lebanese factions continued to harbor deep grievances against the Assad regime.
In the Chouf, the Druze minority stronghold, celebrants gathered to honor their leader, Walid Jumblatt, whose father, Kamal Jumblatt, assassinated in 1977, was presumably one of the first Lebanese political victims of the Baathist regime. Similarly, supporters of the Christian Phalangist and Lebanese Forces parties celebrated in Achrafieh, Zahleh, and Jounieh. They commemorated their martyrs, including former President Bachir Gemayel, whom they hold the Baathist regime responsible for killing.
Sunni Lebanese also celebrated by chanting and distributing baklavas in Beirut, the Beqaa Valley, and particularly in Tripoli, which suffered the most under Syrian occupation in the 1980s. Many Sunnis attributed the assassinations of prominent leaders, including Mufti Hassan Khaled and Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, to the Syrian regime.
In contrast, the Shia-majority regions remained the only exception in this celebratory picture. For Hezbollah and many among its supporters, the fall of the Assad regime represented a devastating blow. Assad had been a critical and historical ally, providing protection and strategic geographical depth through a land corridor connecting Hezbollah to its Iranian backers.
An Intricate Past Relationship
Years of Syrian Baathist domination over Lebanon from 1976 to 2005 saw the regime elevate itself as the ultimate arbitrator of Lebanese politics and security. This position was achieved through a combination of cynical violence and Machiavellian tactics. Following the Lebanese civil war, Syria imposed itself as Lebanon’s protector under what became known as the Pax Syriana. This arrangement arose within the Saudi-Syrian entente, under U.S. patronage, where Syria assumed the role of kingmaker, wielding total control over Lebanon’s domestic politics.
Opponents of the regime were either exiled or imprisoned, as was the case with the Christian opposition. Michel Aoun was forced into exile in Paris, while Samir Geagea was jailed after a politically manipulated trial. During these years, Hezbollah was allowed to remain the sole non-state armed group, officially designated as a resistance force, unlike other militias dismantled after the civil war. This enabled Syria and its Iranian ally to use Hezbollah as a strategic lever against Israel and, by extension, the United States.
Syrian domination ultimately ended in 2005 after massive protests and intense international pressure, particularly from the United States, following the assassination of Rafik Hariri. This led to the division of Lebanese politics into the pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian blocs of March 8 and March 14, respectively, paralyzing the democratic process that culminated in violent clashes in May 2008.
The polarization was exacerbated with the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, as Lebanon became a victim of conflict spillover. In the northern city of Tripoli, clashes erupted between pro- and anti-Syrian regime factions, opposing Lebanese Alawites against Sunni armed groups. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s direct intervention in the Syrian conflict alongside Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2013 further endangered Lebanon’s domestic stability. Then-President Michel Sleiman proposed a policy of dissociation through the Baabda Declaration, which Hezbollah disregarded as it continued its engagement in support of the Assad regime.
In parallel, the Syrian conflict triggered one of the worst humanitarian tragedies of the 21st century, with millions of internally displaced people and refugees. Lebanon soon became host to at least 1.5 million Syrian refugees, making it the country with the highest refugee population per capita in the world.
Filling in The Vacuum
The Assad regime might have fallen nine years ago if not for the critical support provided by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Thousands of combatants, overseen by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, along with Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war since 2013, sustained the regime. However, recent developments have shifted the balance. The Israeli war on Hezbollah forced the group to withdraw from Syria, redirect its focus to its own front, and leave the Syrian regime increasingly vulnerable. This shift created a vacuum that, added to other factors, constituted the direct catalyst of the Assad regime’s fall. These factors are detailed below.
Hezbollah’s weakening: Hezbollah’s setbacks in the war in Lebanon, its redeployment to South Lebanon, and the resulting void left in Syria marked a turning point. Parallelly, the group’s aura of fear and invincibility crumbled, further eroding its morale and public image and encouraging its opponents to challenge its military dominance again. Moreover, Assad was either unable or unwilling to fully support Hezbollah in its war against Israel. This might have, in return, affected Hezbollah’s engagement in defending the Syrian regime.
Iran’s challenges: Beyond Hezbollah, Iran was also significantly affected by the developments in Lebanon. The new Iranian administration showed signs of disengagement on certain fronts, particularly following relentless Israeli airstrikestargeting pro-Iranian forces across Syria. These strikes inflicted heavy losses not only on Iranian military advisors but also on proxy militias like the Fatimiyoun Brigade.
Russia’s limitations: Russia’s deep involvement in its war in Ukraine relegated Syria to a secondary priority. Moreover, Moscow reassigned underperforming generals from the Ukrainian front to Syria, further reducing its effectiveness. It became clear that Russia would not invest more in saving Assad and might rather choose to engage with the opposition through Turkish mediation.
Turkey’s opportunism: Turkey, although engaged in negotiations with Assad, faced an impasse due to Assad’s insistence on the withdrawal of Turkish forces as a precondition. Exploiting the vacuum, Turkey encouraged Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allied forces to advance, having previously restrained them for months.
Structural weaknesses of the Syrian Army: Years of internal divisions within the Syrian army, driven by competingRussian and Iranian influences – involving Maher al-Assad’s Fourth Brigade – severely weakened the military. Corruption, economic collapse, and the devaluation of the currency further demoralized troops, leaving them unwilling to engage in meaningful combat.
Main Winners and Losers
Turkey and Israel are undoubtedly the two most prominent winners of the regime change in Syria, while Iran emerges as the unequivocal loser.
For Turkey, this development consolidated its position as a key player in both the Syrian and Levantine political landscapes. After years of struggling with the consequences of the Syrian conflict, Turkey successfully advanced its agenda. In this respect, Erdogan’s government was primarily concerned by the refugee crisis and the rise of Kurdish independence ambitions that threatened to spill over into its own Kurdish regions. By leveraging its allied Syrian proxies, Turkey reestablished itself as a central player in Syria’s future domestic politics, ultimately replacing Iran.
Israel also emerged as a clear beneficiary. The regime change disrupted the Axis of Resistance by severing a critical link in the weapons supply chain from Iran to Hezbollah. Additionally, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) seized the opportunity to conduct one of the largest air campaigns in its history just hours after Assad’s fall. This campaign destroyed 80% of the Syrian Army’s capabilities, including air and naval bases, significantly diminishing Syria’s potential to pose a future threat. Furthermore, Israel violated the 1974 ceasefire agreement in the Golan Heights and occupied the UN buffer zonebetween the two counties and the strategic Mount Hermon peak.
On the contrary, Iran suffered substantial setbacks. The drastic weakening of its main proxy, Hezbollah, combined with the fall of the Assad regime, undermined its strategic depth and severed its territorial continuity with Lebanon and its front with Israel. These losses also dealt a severe blow to Iran’s regional image and deterrence, reducing its credibility as a long-term competitor to Israel in the region.
Drawing Lessons Learned from The Region
Syria must draw lessons from the past experiences of countries like Iraq and Libya. It is crucial to avoid vengeance-driven actions, such as extrajudicial executions or mass condemnations, and instead adhere strictly to legal processes and tribunals in the future. Inclusivity and broad participation should be prioritized as much as possible. However, inclusivity must be differentiated from general amnesty, which might condemn accountability and jeopardize good governance, as was the case in post-civil war Lebanon.
De-Baathification, as seen in Iraq, must be avoided, as it excluded significant segments of the population from governance, leading to frustration and marginalization. This policy directly contributed to the rise of ISIS by leaving hundreds of former soldiers without livelihoods or purpose. Syria should be cautious of similar repercussions, particularly regarding the potential sectarianization of its society. Excluding the Alawites or other religious minorities could lead to a Lebanon-like sociopolitical segregation, which would be highly detrimental to national unity. Additionally, Syria must avoid fragmentation among factions and seek peaceful solutions in addressing the Kurdish question instead of engaging in a renewed armed conflict. This last question will necessitate a challenging yet crucial distancing from the Turkish agenda.
In conclusion, partitioning Syria is not in anyone’s interest. Any reconfiguration of international borders would be detrimental to all regional actors, except for Israel. This “Pandora’s box” would lead to the reemergence of Kurdish irredentism in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, while Israel could take it as an occasion to legalize the annexation of occupied territories like the Golan or the West Bank.While the fall of the Assad regime opens new opportunities, it also comes with significant risks. Ultimately, the Syrian people are the biggest beneficiaries of the end of one of the last remaining brutal dictatorships of the 21st century. However, seizing this opportunity will require wise and careful actions, both domestically and from regional and international powers, to ensure that the lessons of the past are genuinely learned. Until now, HTS leader Al-Jolani seems to have drawn many of these lessons
