The Axis of Resistance is a central pillar of Iran’s regional strategy. It serves as Iran’s “strategic depth,” enabling Tehran to manage regional threats—particularly Israel—beyond its borders while establishing a deterrence framework. Additionally, the Axis functions as a tool to influence and recalibrate the regional policies of the United States, Israel, and other rivals. Fundamentally, this network is designed to shield Iran from direct attacks. More importantly, the Axis of Resistance has masked Iran’s weakness in air power relative to its regional rivals and adversaries.
Following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and the subsequent involvement of Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis in the conflict, Israel’s military response significantly weakened both Hamas and Hezbollah. Additionally, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has posed a fundamental challenge to the status of the Axis of Resistance in the region.
Some analysts even argue that what remains is a ‘Resistance without an Axis’, rendering the very notion of an Axis of Resistance increasingly obsolete.
The most significant impact of these developments was on the public perception of supporters of the Iranian political system. Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, speeches by Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Foreign Minister, and IRGC officials sought to shape a narrative that could address the questions and uncertainties raised, particularly among pro-regime factions.
The primary concern among regime supporters was why Iran had not provided the necessary support to Bashar al-Assad and why Syria—once portrayed as a ‘shrine’ (referring to the Sayyidah Zaynab Shrine)—was left undefended despite the shrine’s continued existence. This question arose because, at one point, Iran justified its military involvement in Syria under the banner of ‘defending the shrine.’ Iranian forces who died in Syria were honored as ‘defenders of the shrine,’ with the rhetoric equating the protection of the shrine to the defense of Iran itself. However, in the recent attack by Tahrir al-Sham, no such support was extended to the Assad regime, raising doubts among Iran’s pro-regime supporters.
In response to this question, the first issue raised was that Bashar al-Assad did not fully align with the Axis of Resistance following the Gaza War. Conversely, some have cited Ayatollah Khamenei as having repeatedly warned Assad to pay attention to the concerns of his people.
However, there is no public record of such warnings being raised during official meetings between Ayatollah Khameneiand Bashar al-Assad. On the contrary, Khamenei has frequently praised Assad, once describing him as “a great fighter.” In their most recent meeting on May 30, 2024, Khamenei reaffirmed that “resistance is Syria’s distinctive identity,” emphasizing that Syria’s regional significance stems from this characteristic and that it must be preserved.
Even after the fall of Assad’s government, Khamenei refrained from publicly criticizing him. In response to claims that Iran did not support the Assad regime, Ayatollah Khamenei stated in his first speech following Assad’s ouster that Iran had attempted to support him until the very end but was ultimately obstructed by Israel and the United States.
Nonetheless, Iran later announced that because the Syrian army refused to engage in combat against Tahrir al-Sham forces, Iranian-affiliated forces also refrained from defending Assad. Following his removal, Khamenei shifted the justification for Iran’s involvement in Syria from protecting Assad’s regime to safeguarding Iran’s national security. He aimed to clarify that Iran’s presence in Syria was primarily driven by the need to counter the threat posed by ISIS, rather than by a commitment to Assad himself. Consequently, Iran sought to emphasize nationalist motivations in framing its intervention in Syria.
In this context, Ayatollah Khamenei justified the presence of Iranian forces in Syria and Iraq by highlighting their role in combating ISIS. He described ISIS as a direct security threat, stating that the group aimed to destabilize Syria and Iraq as a prelude to expanding its operations into Iran. Preventing the spread of insecurity to Iran was, therefore, a central reason for the Islamic Republic’s determination to confront ISIS. He further noted that Iranian officials quickly recognized the necessity of stopping ISIS to prevent widespread instability within Iran, pointing to past terrorist attacks, such as those at the Majlis (Iranian Parliament), the Shah Cheragh Shrine, and Kerman, as evidence of the threat.
Despite this, according to IRGC commanders, Iran’s presence in Syria was primarily aimed at protecting the Assad regime under the direct orders of Ayatollah Khamenei. Mahmoud Chaharbaghi, then-commander of the Quds Force artillery in Syria, stated that the mission of the Quds Force and Qassem Soleimani was to safeguard Assad’s government on the orders of Iran’s Supreme Leader. According to him, ISIS had not yet emerged as a threat at that time.
Even after the defeat of ISIS in Syria, Iran maintained its presence in the country to establish it as a logistical hub for the Axis of Resistance and to enhance its strategic threat against Israel.
One of the main criticisms—both from public opinion and even from some supporters of the Islamic Republic—was that the sacrifices of Iranian youth and years of investment in Syria had been wasted. In response, Ayatollah Khamenei dismissed those who viewed Iran’s regional strategy as a failure, asserting that the bloodshed in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere had not been in vain.
Meanwhile, Tehran has sought to challenge the argument that Iran and the Axis of Resistance have been weakened by the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government. In doing so, Iranian officials have increasingly emphasized the spiritual and ideological dimensions of the resistance. While this perspective is not entirely inaccurate, the heavy focus on the soft power of the Axis of Resistance appears to be an attempt to downplay its declining military capabilities.
In his first speech after Assad’s fall, Ayatollah Khamenei stated: “The arrogant powers believe that the Axis of Resistance has weakened following the collapse of Syria’s pro-resistance government. However, they are gravely mistaken because they fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the resistance. Resistance is not merely a military force that can be dismantled; it is a belief system, an ideology, and a heartfelt commitment. For this reason, resistance only grows stronger under pressure, its members become more motivated, and its influence expands.”
Similarly, Iranian Vice President Mohammad Javad Zarif, in his first reaction to Assad’s downfall, argued: “Those who assume that Iran has been weakened by Assad’s fall are operating under the false belief that the Axis of Resistance consists of Iranian proxies. The Axis of Resistance was neither created by Iran nor does its survival depend on Iran.”
Khamenei reinforced this stance, stating: “They often claim that the Islamic Republic has lost its proxies in the region. The Islamic Republic does not have proxy forces.”
Accordingly, Iran seeks to portray the Axis of Resistance as resilient and capable of revival despite the setbacks it has endured. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in this regard: “The future of the Axis of Resistance remains bright. Hezbollah in Lebanon is continually rebuilding itself. Israel entered Gaza intending to destroy Hamas, yet today it finds itself negotiating a ceasefire with the same Hamas.”
In a speech on January 8, 2025, Ayatollah Khamenei reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to supporting regional resistance movements: “The resistance is alive, must remain alive, and must grow stronger day by day. We support the Axis of Resistance—the resistance in Gaza, the resistance in the West Bank, the resistance in Lebanon, the resistance in Yemen. Wherever they stand and resist the Zionist regime [Israel], we support them.”
However, with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government and Syria’s diminishing logistical role in facilitating arms transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s ability to rearm has faced significant challenges. Political scientist Vali Nasr has suggested that, due to recent developments in Syria, Iran may no longer be able to use the country as a bridge to Lebanon to support Hezbollah as it did in the past.
In addition to these challenges, the Lebanese air route has also encountered strict limitations on arms transfers and financial aid to Hezbollah. For instance, on the night of January 2, 2025, an Iranian Mahan Airlines plane was subjected to an intensive inspection upon landing at Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport under the suspicion of carrying funds from the Islamic Republic to Hezbollah. According to the Saudi-based Al-Hadath news channel, Iran had planned to transfer millions of dollars in cash to Hezbollah via this flight.
Similarly, on September 28, 2024, Israel reportedly blocked Iranian aircraft from landing at Beirut Airport and closed Lebanese airspace to Iranian planes. This pattern of restrictions on Iranian flights may continue as part of Israel’s broader strategy.
Nevertheless, some analysts argue that despite the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the fall of the Assad regime, Yemen remains a critical stronghold within the Axis of Resistance. Hussein Allah Karam, an IRGC commander, has asserted: “Syria served as both a strategic anchor and a logistical connector for the Axis of Resistance, playing an irreplaceable role in a potential northern front invasion of Palestine. However, with Syria’s loss, this role has now been assigned to Yemen.”
Despite Iran’s efforts to downplay regional developments, it is important to acknowledge that the regional balance of power has shifted to its disadvantage. With the fall of the Assad regime, Iran has lost a key pillar of its so-called Shiite Crescent, as well as the land corridor it previously used to arm Hezbollah and expand its influence in Lebanon and the broader Levant. Consequently, Iran’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is likely to diminish, as it has lost a crucial source of leverage. In response to its declining regional power, Iran may be compelled either to retreat strategically or to accelerate efforts to cross the nuclear threshold as a means of compensation.
“Iran will definitely reassess its defense doctrine, which was largely based on the Axis of Resistance,” states Sanam Vakil, director of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Program. She argues that the Islamic Republic is also likely to reexamine its nuclear program and consider further investment in it to bolster the regime’s security.
Similarly, Richard Haass, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, contends that the developments following October 7, 2023, have marked “the beginning of the end of Iran’s regional primacy.” He asserts that the Islamic Republic’s influence has weakened to an unprecedented degree, domestic dissatisfaction with the regime has reached its peak, and economic challenges—exacerbated by sanctions—have left the government struggling to meet even the most basic needs of its society. Nevertheless, Haass suggests that the U.S. administration should prioritize the nuclear issue and engage in negotiations with Tehran.
In this evolving regional landscape, Turkey has emerged as a more influential actor, with its role in Iraq and Lebanon expected to expand. According to Nasr, Turkey’s gains in Syria could be of concern to the broader region. For Arab states—from Egypt and Jordan to the Persian Gulf monarchies—the victory of Tahrir al-Sham in Syria evokes fears reminiscent of the Arab Spring, an upheaval they believed they had successfully contained.
This concern was echoed by Anwar Gargash, senior diplomatic advisor to the president of the United Arab Emirates, who remarked after the fall of the Assad regime: “We have to wait and see what will happen in Syria,” emphasizing that a reliable government must take office. “The main concern now is the integrity of Syrian territory, which is under threat. Iran remains a significant regional actor, and dialogue with Tehran on these developments is essential,” he added.
Given these dynamics, Iran may seek closer ties with countries such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia to counterbalance Turkey’s expanding influence. However, Gulf Arab states remain reluctant to align with Iran in confronting Turkey. In other words, the extent of Iran’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the UAE should not be overstated. In a new regional order shaped by Turkey, the United States, and Israel, Gulf Arab states are increasingly driven by a sense of insecurity stemming from the waning U.S. presence and shifting power dynamics. Moreover, the weakening of Iranian-backed proxy groups is a development they view favorably.
Meanwhile, Turkey is also working to reassure Gulf Arab states regarding Syria’s future governance. Turkish officials are keen to avoid repeating the mistakes of the 2010s Arab Spring, which plunged the region into greater instability. To that end, they recognize the importance of regional and Western allies in stabilizing Syria. President Recep Tayyip Erdoganhas, therefore, sought to collaborate with Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE—both of which are wary of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood—to secure their long-term support for Syria’s reconstruction.
For Israel, the weakening of Iran’s regional alliance following Assad’s downfall strengthens its strategic position in the Levant. However, Israel is also uneasy about what might replace Assad’s regime. If a new government led by Tahrir al-Sham consolidates power in Syria, it is likely to oppose Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights and may not remain neutral on the Palestinian issue. The group’s Sunni Arab ties to Palestinian factions are undeniable.
Ali Bakir, a professor at the Ibn Khaldun Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, argues that if the new Syrian government prioritizes confrontation with Israel over nation-building, Iran’s influence in Syria could persist, enabling Tehran to strengthen its ties with Shiites, Alawites, and even elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. Conversely, if tensions between Turkey and Israel escalate in Syria—potentially leading Tel Aviv to support Syrian Kurdish groups—Ankara might leverage its relationship with Iran as a counterweight to Israel.
Regarding Iran’s broader foreign policy, historical patterns suggest that significant shifts typically occur in response to strategic deadlocks rather than as part of a premeditated roadmap. This tendency was evident following the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88), when the revolutionary government, having initially pursued a revisionist and expansionist foreign policy, pivoted toward a more conservative approach centered on preserving Iran’s security—what some have termed the “Umm al-Qura” doctrine of Shiite geopolitics. In this context, Iran is likely to reassess its regional role and seek to restore its strategic relationships amid the evolving Middle Eastern order.
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